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MAJOR COOiERClAL CRISES
IN THE
UNITED STATES SINCE THE CIVIL WAR
INTRODUCTION
In this discussion the material has tended to show indirectly the
effect of crises upon business by emphasizing the change in the bank-
ing and monetary systems and in the stock market before and during a
crisis* There are several reasons for this:
a* No adequate statistics are available showing specifically
what has taken place in business during a crisis*
b* The l\ill effect of a crisis upon business is never fully
felt until the crisis has become history and business has
entered the phase of depression*
c* In the laust analysis, commerce and industry are basically
dependent upon a sound currency, adequate banking system,
and a stock market facilitating the free flow of capital
into enterprise* There is, therefore, a much closer tie-
up between this group and business than is at first appre-
ciated*
From a careful study of the period since the Civil War, I have
found that at no time in our history have we had a sound currency,
sound banking system, and a stock market that served its proper func-
tion* At times we have had one or two of these fundamental units of
sound economic development, but never all three of them*
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During the latter part of the nineteenth century, the chief issues
were an imsound currency and a decentralized banking system* Banking
was too often associated with speculative enterprise and stock market
Omnipula ti on*
The adoption of the gold standard gave us a sound currency but the
inelastic banking system continued until the organization of the Federal
Reserve System in 1913* This left only the stock market in need of re-
fomation* The stock market has always been more than a market for capi-*
tal* It has not only provided capital for sound and unsound ejq>ansion
and economic development, but it has also provided the great gambling
center for speculation in railroad, mining, and industrial securities,
and through association with other ezchanges in commodities, it has
proved to be more than a mirror of economic conditions* It anticipates
changes, and it is here that we find not only the first indications of
approaching crisis, but also the first indications of iii5)roving busi-
ness*
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CHAPa?ER I
The Meaning of Crisis In the Business Cycle
The terms panic and crisis are heard so frequently when one is
speaking of industrial and financial disturbances, that in many in-
stances, the words are used interchangeably. Quite naturally the first
step out of this confusion is to clarify the meaning of the different
terms.
Panic is defined as:
**A sudden widespread fright or apprehension concerning
financial affairs, resulting in an artificial depression in
values caused by violent measures for protection or for the
sale of securities or other property. "('O
Another authority defines it as:
"The prevalence of unreasoning and overpowering alarm in
financial or coimaercial circles or in both, leading to sudden
and stringent restrictions of credit and great shrinkage in
values, and precipitating failures, often a precursor of a
financial crisis." ('j)
On the other hand, crisis is defined as:
"A time of difficulty, danger, and suspense in commerce
or finance." (i)
"A ttirning point in the progress of an affair or a series
of events."
From the preceding information. It is apparent that the panic is a
short wave of emotion, alarm, and unreasoning fear that may be disas-
trous in its effects but which is necessarily short-lived. A crisis
may precipitate a panic, may accompany or even succeed it, but differs
(/) l^STER’S NEW IHTEBNATIONAL DICTIOKARI
(a) FUMK AKD WAGHALL»S DICTIONARY
(3) WEBSTER *3 NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
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2dtfiego in that the crisis is usually a fundamental and basic condition
while the panic is more properly psychological* John Stuart Mill drew
a clear line of distinction between the two when he said:
'sphere is said to be a comnercial crisis when a great
number of merchants and traders at once either have, or ap-
prehend that they shall have, a difficulty in meeting’ their
engagements,”
It is apparent, therefore, that the crisis is also a relatively
brief period coming as a climax to an era of prosperity and great in-
dustrial development, and acting as a forerunner of a period of de-
clining business and depression that succeeds it* The business cycle
then, may be summed up as having three distinct phases: prosperity,
crisis or liquidation, and depression or declining business*
L great financial crisis usually comes to a climax during the
spring or autumn due to the fact that in these two periods of the
year, not only does the trade position receive a severe testing, but
also the demand for necessary credit is at its maximum* Comnercial
crises appear to be closely aligned with financial crises for one
tends to precipitate the other* In no two periods of crisj’s, however,
(3)
do we find just the same combination of elements*
Crises have the function of bringing to our attention that which
we would be glad to ignore—namely, that excessive amounts of capital
have been Invested in fixed assets, and that a period of digestion is
essential* Once the climax has been reached and the process of
0 John Stuart Mill, PRINCIPLES OP POLITICAL ECONOMI, 1888, p. 338.
(St) Alexander D* Noyes, WAR PERIOD OP AMERICAN FINANCE, 1926, p* 382.
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W* C* Mitchell, BUSINESS CYCLES, 1913, p. 582*
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liquidation began, it extends rapidly, partially because business men
who are called upon to settle maturing obligations immediately apply
pressure to their debtors* As this process spreads, the liquidation
fO
becomes more or less severe* The crisis ends when this demand for
prompt liquidation ceases* It ends because the members of a business
community have, on the whole, successfully withstood the test that has
been given their ability to meet their financial obligations* Those
who have been unable to meet their engagements have failed or been
forced to reorganize*
Business then enters upon a period of diminishing output and con-
sumption—not because conditions are still unsound, but because the
insufficiency of new orders blights the hope of a quick restoration of
prosperity* Depression continues until the overexpanded industry and
business have adjusted themselves to the new situation, despondency
over the future has changed to confidence, or some unforeseen event
brings prosperity to a given group in the nation whose demand for
goods creates a demand upon industry and again starts it on the slow
climb to prosperity*
f/;President*s Committee Report, BUSINESS CYCLES AND UNEMPLOYMENT, 1923, p*15.
4^* C* Mitchell, BUSINESS CYCLES, 1913, p* 555*
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CHAPTER II
The Crisis of 1875
A. Background of the Crisis
In order to fully appreciate the tremendous significance of
the crisis of 1873 and the terrific i^ock which it gave to busi-
ness and financial interests, it is essential to at least briefly
suTTsy the economic development that preceded its outbreak in the
early part of September,
The close of the Civil War had caused the return of two great
armies of soldiers to private life. Industry, however, had made
such rapid strides during the war and the opening of the west
made so much free land available, that these men had been q^uickly
absorbed, Prom 1869 to 1873 had been a period of great prosperity.
The growth of railroads had been phenomenal for between 1867 and
1873, 32,000 miles of line were built—an eimount which exceeded
the total mileage existing in 1859, This railroad boom had caused
great expansion in iron and steel making, railroad equipment, and
(()
coal and oil* The textile industry and the manufacture of boots
and shoes were growing rapidly due to impetus given by the Civil
War , The development of farm machinery and equipment was only in
its infancy but was growing by leaps and bounds. The penetration
of the railroads westward had caused the population of that sec-
tion to grow rapidly. The demand for wheat had attracted many to
W, J, Schuter, ECONOMIC CYCLES AKD GRISES, 1935, p, 194
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-OOB *«d* to aolJaXxrqoCi »d* iboewho 6*i/i bxaief^eow sidio’xXiex ed* to
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.#ex
.'i ,st:fex ,:da8iHo. ax/^ cSjoyd oBsatcx .:to*odo6 .t .tr
the vast prairie country of the west as railroads made markets avail-
able, l/Ianufacturing of all kinds had been stimulated by the Civil
War, Per capita production in the United States from 1864 to 1873
('J
had increased 50 per cent, The growth of tariff barriers had pro-
tected the many new industries and fostered their expansion. Much
real progress had been made but the rapidity of the growth was not
consistent with healthy development. Facilities for the production
of maiiy commodities had fao* exceeded the limits of profitable demand
and much of this e^^ansion had been carried on upon an insufficient
foundation of working capital. When they were subjected to the strain
of the crisis and the long depression that followed it, many of these
undertakings failed.
The most serious weakness was disclosed in connection with
the railroads. Much of the construction for these roads had been
financed ly the sale of bonds at a heavy discount. Furthermore,
much of the construction was in areas of relatively scanty popu-
lation which could not create enough traffic to enable the rail-
roads to meet fixed charges on their excessive floating debts.
With the advance of the crisis, railroad construction had to be
discontinued altogether. This, of course, iianediately affected
all the other industries who owed a large measure of their pros-
perity to the railroads.
Warren M, Persons, FORECASTING BUSINESS CYCLES, 1931, p, 83
0, W, Sprague, HISTORY OF CRISES UNDER THE NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM,
1910, p, 1
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B« The Beginning of the Crisis
As so often happens, the crisis was ushered in by an outstand-
ing failure* On September 18, 1873, the failure of Ja^ j Cooke and
Company was announced* This old and reputable financial house had
helped finance the Civil War but had now become insolvent through
large advances to the Northern Pacific Railroad* This failure was
in itself relatively unimportant, but it tended to act as a climax
and to unduly enphasize the two great failures that had preceded
it* The first of these, the hew York Warehouse and Security Com-
pany had been forced to suspend on September 8* Originally organ-
ized for the purpose of dealing in grain and produce, it had foolishly
endeavored to finance the Missouri and Texas Railroad* On Saturday,
September 13, the banking house of Kenyon, Cox and Company had
failed owing to its endorsements on $1,500,000 of the paper of the
Canada Southern Railroad* These two failures had caused a flurry
in the stock exchange but had not been regarded as serious* With
the failure of Jay, Cooke and Con^any, however, extravagant ru-
mors to the effect that several banking and brokerage houses were
on the verge of collapse spread rapidly and were reflected by a
decline in the stock market* Country banks began to call back
their deposits from the city banks and in some cases, individual
depositors were becomixig uneasy and demanding their funds* Public
confidence had been severely shaken*
Early on the morning of September 20, the Union Trust Con?)any
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And tlie Fational Bank of the CoMoonwealth closed* The stock ez"*
change reacted to this information by such a rapid decline in prices
that the governing board met at eleven o'clock and determined to
0
close the exchange until some semblance of order was restored. The
exchange remained closed for ten days.
With the closing of the exchange, one journal said,
"We are passing through a season of great doubt and
depression. Financial rottenness has been disclosed where
all was believed fair and sound*" ('^)
This seems to epitomize the prevailing distrust and apprehen-
sion*
The business of the country had been carried on upon a fixed
amount of inconvertible paper money consisting largely of green-
backs issued during the Civil War* Under the National Banking
System, the bank-note circulation was very irresponsive to vary-
ing trade demands* In time of crisis, national bank notes could
. ,
(i)
not be depended upon to provide additional currency. This was
partially due to the limitation of the government bonds against
which bank notes could be issued and partially due to the fact
that gold was not available to serve as a basis of note issues.
The situation was acute and in order to allay the panic, it was
absolutely necessary to secure cessation of further loan contrac-
tion or the failures would rapidly spread to other branches of
trade and even further endanger the banking structure*
f/3
^omnercial and financial Clironicle
,
September 20, 1873, p* 382*
^
j CoMoercial Bulletin, Saturday, September 20, 1873, p* 2*
^^)Edwin W* Kemmerer, THE A* B* C* OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 1929, p. IS
'X9 3looit ,5duoXo rfi-l4Pma'V.oO odd* lo iu£«a Ijocolt^l? Lxto
sooi'rq til snilood Jjlq&r a dom \,d nolte^xo^'^l ildJ- o& oiiWArf-o
o- ftdftifft'roit'io XuiA ^ioolo^o nsvela dA dfiicv IriMOd i^&ictr&vc^ »dd dAdd*
odT ./}9!jods9T: -AW 'roi)*!© lo oo/ieldinsia ^xaos Xidcu osnAitox3 odd oaoXo
nod ^o’i .?>o<iolo tsalaoi&i e^m&sioxs
,foiA« XACfXjt/oi, ©no <9srti3dox9 ©dd lo gnisoXo ©rfd ddll
,
baj& ddnoJE) ddoig lo noa&SB a d^;fC'M4- gftisaAq ©ia ©W**
', aredw X»8oXoaiX> naod cAd saonnoddoa XAionAnX'^l ,.aoX&Beiq©i)
**.X>flyOG XiA TiAl f) 0YslX©ci uAw XXa
-*n©tt«*2qqA haj? dafddaiJb tiaXXiAYeiq ©dd ©aincdiq© od yaio©3 aidl’
.nolB
boxil A acqxf no Jboli'iao nosd bAil ’^idnnoo ©dd 1<S aa»fiiar/cf Sidl'
“-asaos. io ^iss'^aX anidsiaftoo vmom i^Idiitr&raoonJ: lo drufoaie
^xiJ&frtal JanoXdail add leMU .na'.', XiviO ia;f.d aniiob AoneaX B:»iOAd
-<,xftv od ©YiBcoqofj'irtX tcysy saw noXdaX-aoaio 9doit-2i5ted sild ,iu6d3x.2
oX.r.oo oodoft 'iuTwd
, Xaaoid.2^ ^sis/rs lo 90:1 + nl* VaXcaciofi e£>A'id gjni
Ctj
aAW axxiT .voitoiwo XanoidifeX/a ©LiYO'xq od noqj;/ X^XnoqoX ©d don.
doniA'^A ei)fiocf dner-'novo;? add lo *'|oidadi»iiX ©dd od ©nX ’'iXXAid'iaq
doal odd Od ©no itlXaivTaq Xae Xetfsiel ed Xlnoo aodon i£n«d doidlw
.S&JJ381 ©doft lo aiead a aa ©T*j:©a od,- ©XdAXXAva don saw i)Xoa dadd
saw dX ^oXnaq add 'iwIXa od •rsJErco ni Xixo edt/oa bbw xioXdAitdXa ©05?
-oAidnoo rjjipX T&xld*jwl lo noidasaeo smfo&e od 'i-xaeeeracf ;i£odnXoedA
lo eddonaicf laddo od Xaanqa '^;XXXqAi XIn'cw aswl-tal odd 'lo noid
, ©'ix/dojn.de jji'tticoEscf arid T:6S(TAXn© loddrf.a'l nave iina e^Ui^J
.SOE .q ,gS?eX «CS ‘lodmadgeg
,
sToSrY‘*rjTtr''X!^T3SiHlET x}iA"X(8lor3Dtsoff
.S .q ,EV8X jCS Ti;©ct£Ef&dqae, ,x»feX»'^da£ ,nXdaXI.s;a XaioiaaiaoO (^\
£X.q,eS(JX ,IAa(raY2 dHTHSKeH JAHXTOa:? « .0 .a .A M5? ,r.rT6idUD){ .'.V niwxa,^^
To meet this situation, the New York baulks In the Clearing
House Association determined, on September 20, to authorize the
issue of certificates of deposit based upon bills receivable or
other securities deposited with the clearing house by member banks
suid subject to the approval and acceptance of a committee of seven
appointed by the clearing house. These certificates paid seven
per cent interest and were acceptable in the settlement of bank
balances at the clearing house for a period up to November 1.
The total issue of these certificates amounted to only $26,505,000.
The action of the exchange and the clearing house appears to
have been opportune, for on Monday, September 22, the worst stage
of the crisis evidently had passed. The financial and banking
aspects of the crisis now began to give way to the commercial
stringencies of the situation. Foreign exchange was so depressed
that great difficulty in moving the crops eastward and abroad
was beginning to be experienced by the middle of the week. Prices
of domestic merchandise had begun to decline and the domestic
exchanges, due to inability to secure remittances, had become
(^)
disrupted. By September 30, hoarding of currency was in evidence
and the consequent development of currency premiixms tended to
keep funds from finding their way to the banks. This in turn
led to difficulty in securing funds for pay rolls. Greenbacks
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commanded a premium like gold and by October 18, money, i.e., cash
O)
was worth (in premium) 150 per cent per annum*
The continued deep distrust of the banks and the hoarding of
currency retarded the marketing of goods with the result that
prices continued to decline slowly. Many factories in various
parts of the country began to shut down either due to inability to
meet pay rolls or because business was either declining or at a
standstill*
It has been pointed out that one of the basic causes of the
crisis was construction and unsound expansion of many railroads.
This had been growing increasingly evident as numerous roads were
forced to default on their interest payments due to insufficient
earnings on capitalization. Many of these roads could never oper-
ate at a profit xintil thousands of settlers moved in and occupied
the sparsely settled regions through which many of these roads
ran. By the fifteenth of November, the sum total of railroad
bonds on which interest was overdue and unpaid reached the sum
of $217,959,311 or 13 per cent of all railroad indebtedness out-
standing. The railroad difficulties of course made financing
of further construction ic^ossible at this time. The result was
that only 4,097 miles were constructed during 1873 as against
5,875 miles in 1872 and 7,379 miles in 1871, Practically all of
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this had been built before the crisis had assumed alarming propor-
tions*
The crisis which had started in New York as a financial affair
had rapidly spread to the other cities and towns throughout the
country so that by the eleventh of October, the damage to business
in the interior began to have a marked reaction upon the business
(Oin New York* This depression in business throughout the nation
diminished the requirements for use of money in general circulation
so that by the third week in October, there was a pronounced move-
rs
ment of cash to the banks*
Of all the sections suffering from the crisis, the west ap-
peared to be standing up remarkably well—due perhaps, to the fact
that exports were growing with the resumption of foreign exchange*
No doubt much of this increase in e^orts had been due to the stimu-
lus given by the rapid decline in the price of wheat with the onset
of the crisis* Wheat had fallen from |1*13 a bushel on September 19
to f*90 a bushel five days later. With the resim^tion of foreign
exchange, that price had rapidly risen above a dollar and continued
to fluctuate within a relatively narrow range*
Declining trade with the consequent return of currency to the
banks brought about a tendency toward easier rates in the money
market by the first week in December* Premiums on currency had
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declined and by December 20, they had disappeared. The condition
of the New York City banks was reported to be good ajad clearing
house certificates outstanding amounted to only $3,605,000. Pinal
cancellation of these certificates took place on January 14, 1874,
The volume of business was small, speculation had died out in the
few staples in which it had lingered, and there was a general dis-
position to wait and see ^at the new year would bring forth. This
strengthening of bank reserves, declining trade, elimination of
fear and apprehension, and the return of currency to par obviously
marks the end of the crisis.
It may be pointed out from the preceding material that there
was a total absence of the three fundamental economic requisites
for sound industrial development—namely, sound currency, a sound
banking system, and a stock market that performs its proper func-
tion during tte boom that ended in this crisis. The currency was
a redundant, irredeemable paper money. The banking system was
weak, decentralized and incapable of unified action. The stock
market, the least important of the three requisites at this time,
was also unsoimd. The basis of the boom had been the railroad
development which was financed largely through bonds with a good
portion of the so-called "water" in the form of stock which was
either given as a bonus with the purchase of bonds or largely
retained by the organizers of the railroads. The point remains,
however, that the majority of listed stocks at this period were
(0 Coimiercial and 1‘inancial Chro^'cle, December 20, 1873, p, 443,
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those of railroads and that the market value of many railroad stocks
was based solely upon the future^anticipated earnings* If we look
upon the stock market’s function as that of providing a place for
the purchase and sale of capital, it becomes increasingly clear
that the stock market in 1873 was not performing its function
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CHAPTER III
The Crisis of 1664
A* Prosperity and Decline
The depression which followed the crisis of 1875 lasted until
the summer of 1679. Harvest failures and crops which were smaller
than usual throughout Europe and a favorable season in the United
States created excellent conditions for large exports of farm
products. Prices for wheat were high so that the farmers and the
grain-carrying railroads enjoyed good incomes. The prosperity of
these two groups created a demand for other commodities and thus
stimulated manufacturing which in turn affected other producers
of raw materials. Thus, one demand stimulated others and the
recovery was rapid. This wave of prosperity continued during
1880 and 1881 but culminated in 1682 when business began to re-
cede. The volume of business continued to decline during 1885
but it was not until May 1884 that the crisis became acute.
The crisis of 1884 was of a financial natxire. Business had
been slowly diminishing for nearly two years when the crisis oc-
curred. No doubt this is the chief reason that the depression
which followed was so brief and had such a small effect upon
(f)
industry. It also partially e3q)lains why the financial crisis
failed to have the disastrous effect upon business that has so
(/JW. C. Mitchell, BUSINESS CYCLES, 1913, p. 45
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often accompanied violent fluctuations in the financial markets*
During August 1883, the Wall Street National Bank had gone
into voluntary liquidation due to over-certification of checks*
There had also been many commercial failures and a number of rail'
road receiverships but no outstanding or alarming banking or fi-
nancial failures* Commodity and security prices had shown, in
sympathy with business, considerable decline although bank loans
expanded slightly* Some writers have said that the changes in
the tariff were a major cause of the crisis but there appears to
be no foundation for this be lie
The abandonment of silver as a basis of note-issues had by
this time been nearly con^jleted in Europe* In 1878, the United
States, through the passage of the Bland-Allison Act, a compro-
mise measure, had provided for the monthly addition of two to
four million dollars* worth of silver to the monetary resources
of the nation. It had been pointed out that gold production
was diminishing and that use of silver would not only raise the
value of the metal but would preserve and not depress prices*
Throughout this period, the prices of farm products were low due
to the overexpansion of agriculture* The Bland-Allison Act was
really intended as an inflationary measure for it was obvious
0* W. Sprague, CRISES UNDER THE NATIONAL BANKING STSTEM, 1910, p.
Alexander D* Noyes, FORTY YEARS OF AIvIERICAN FINANCE, 1909, p. 96*
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that there was considerable old coin stored up in Europe that
was yet to be sold. By 1880, it had been clearly demonstrated
that silver was continuing to fall in price and that the United
States Treasury was getting such a large amount of silver into
its reserves that there was slight possibility of getting or
keeping most of it in circulation. In 1884, the silver funds in
the Treasury had increased to $53,000,000. A continuation of
the silver policy would soon either impair the gold reserve of
the country or coii5)el the use of silver for payment of gold ob-
ligations, thus bringing about the silver standard.
£« The Development of the Crisis
The rapid increase in silver reserves had not passed un-
noticed in Europe. Foreign investors were becoming distrust-
ful of the ability of the United States to continue gold payments
in the near future. This fear was intensified by the action of
the Sub-Treasurer in New York City, who on February 21, 1884,
in a letter to the manager of the Clearing House Association,
intimated that it might be necessary to use silver in payment
of government balances. This ill-judged hint had the effect of
spreading greater alarm among foreign investors in American
securities. These securities were returned to New York for
sale and the money converted into gold and shipped abroad. In
March, these shipments amounted to $12,200,000 and during April
they rose to $21,000,000.
(/^ A. Barton Hepburn, HISTORY OF CURRENCY IN IHE UNITED STATES, 1924, p. 293.
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By the first of January 1884, the New York and New England
Railroad had been placed in the hands of a receiver. During
February, March and April, there were many unfavorable balance
sheets published and the fall in prices became accentuated not
(O
only in the stock exchange, but in all markets. The decline
of commodity prices had been steady for three years.
The crisis began on Thursday, May 8, with the failure of
the well-known brokerage firm of Grant and Ward, Ferdinand
Ward, who was supposed to be a financial genius, had formed
a partnership with General Grant’s son in order that the firm
might enjoy and profit by the publicity that would be associated
with a great name. This unscrupulous financier had secured loans
from his friends and also from these people he had met through
the Grants. He agreed to repay these loans plus 100 per cent
in ninety days but was wise enough to realize that the people
would reinvest their money. The profits were to be made by
speculation in the stock market. He continued this insane
scheme for nearly two years, during which he constructed a
pyramid of liabilities he could never hope to liquidate. The
Grants lost their entire fortune. From one banker, James D,
Fish, Ward secured $4,144,000. The total liabilities were
$17,000,000 and the assets $700,000. The majority of those
who suffered most through Ward’s manipulations were people who
had been attracted by the honor and respectability of the Grants®
(/) Clement Juglar, BRIEF HISTORY OF PANICS, 1916, p. 106.
C. A. Collman, OUR MYSTERIOUS PANICS, 1931, p. 127-128.
f'XijKi. •’ woTT 5J y , -.n '\q
. ‘“y’sosT 4; -0 vc(v -li i-uj. CLiH
aoiujl ac' e J.o '. ' vjiiiXff ^»TG'a ,J.i;'ic;A i>j~?. ifo'xiui , -o a r.
l&n jts^’.'3Jt.'j'xi300.‘ siu-Aoau sjao.i'ic^ rix IXji'- iaiielf. .,k a-teyrTR
p'lHo&f' ,vAe'Vr.!iSi Ha ai. ^.'"wi , ^iocca srH n' '-*10
os'iivv T-O'i aG«’J 'aaHq vJ'JL.a..iC:iuo
\o G’Ui.C.t.o.'i rUir.' ,-y raA; ^ .tc alaia.i
.
f:-
.^V,' j|-r>;Tr 'tc mii'i 0*1(5 rr^crn;' - . I aw edt
'
r:j?ri'j>'5 tau tiynirc-sg LaIoksu'^ 9'^ oi
iirtil €rfj asbio rii: aoa ’i ’’ : :'o:*jx) ijp. .'.i.naO flv*'i'» lii-ia’reKit'Ui'i -a
-<&t«l&0Eajp /jJLiyov cf&ld i V'^ ^
;aa<.ij. boiitoj^ ' b-f*n <. biWoi.c'wi.''“'y£".''t;/ r:iii7 J" lo'v^ z dtifi
.t jijj iJHii ©iwoSvi '5 „i.'.y fe!0*ti ocI*j fcrtfi ^:. .t' Jj -i* -iiri iti-'X-^
dfr^fi sixlq- uixasgI oaGiiit oj’ b^Z'iy-^- s-i aij-'i'
&Xc[09q Gdi e-:»xl.as'x of .Ijiirow? sy^w i^jd 'l^anirt ni
.;d abciu ©d erraw a^i'io'iq Sii* • ^';iavn;i.o*r fclxioar
'^ixr.fi.c.i' ain'J' X^-r/nioxioo sx-: ni GoiTi/.i/ooc,©
/' bstcf:'S(ic-noo 9d do.in^' ^ ov;d ‘soi jiaa-r.ufi
a'-'x .©dvibis/pil o& &co;i T:L-v>t; t''.JJ<JO vu '.eij il/o/iii x< .....-/£
, T. aaaiijlf .'Xv'^txrad sno wc- - . ir«;v"iO 'i ixerit .^'50x s +oc-v
a dv' -:»:HxIi:ciAi£ X«taJ- xxjiT b&'xx/oaa X)':aV/
©CiOjXiJ' 'i»£fT .COv,OGV4 antjaa..; adt OOC < 000
,
-. X4
oiir yfqocq artoi^' xiixxti.tiXxiui d'^biz* ocixii* boiGi'lx.<& C3..v/
‘xo xl idai+noq^aT. ’xonoxi oxl.- jS L'jd'iiXiiii’ J « .rtaM Lsit
,q ,oXei ,:orU r^*?^^jOK Vil^c ^-alaxiL :!--v.:aiO N
_4. a .Xtifei ,CiOx'"i>j. ciUCii.I'iT'xT/ » ji'x’.' Ov. •*> < --
This failure involved the Marine National Bank whose presi-
dent was a partner of Grant and Ward. The bank failure proved to
be the last straw, the credit system in use for stock operations
collapsed, machinery for making exchanges was disrupted, and no
one wanted stocks or anything else but money. An unreasonable
panic prevailed with a great fall in prices as well as disastrous
f'J
results to brokers and their customers.
On Wednesday, May 13, it became known that John C. Eno,
the young president of the Second National Bank had stolen
$3,185,000 in securities and cash from the bank. The institu-
tion was saved from bankruptcy only by the pron^Jt action of
the directors and the young man’s father who made good the def-
alcation.
The next day, the Newark Savings Bank of Newark, New Jersey,
suspended, due in large measure, to the speculation of its presi-
dent who was also a Wall Street broker. The failures were now
numerous and important; the West Shore Hailroad, the Philadelphia
and Reading, the Metropolitan Bank, George I. Seney, a well-known
financier^and eight prominent banking houses in New York were
among those failures. The excitement and consternation in the
stock market was further increased by the operations of a group
of bear operators who were seeking to ruin Jay Gould. One journal
said:
(t) Commercial and Financial Chronicle, May 17, 1884, p. 502
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"Every day adds to the unsavory disclosures and
to the list of failures. The continuance of troubles in
financial circles has had an unfavorable effect upon gen-
eral trade. Foreign exchange is depressed. Coal production
is to be further restricted."
During this period, rates of discount had risen to as high
(^)
as 4 per cent a day. On May 14, the New York Clearing House Asso-
ciation loet and decided to issue clearing house certificates. The
rapidity of the decision with which the banks met the situation did
much to reestablish confidence throught the nation. These clearing
house certificates paid only 3 per cent interest as compared with
seven per cent during the crisis of 1873. The Ifctropolitan Bank
was enabled, through the deposit of securities and other collateral
with the Clearing House, to reopen its doors on May 15 the day
after it had been forced to suspend. The maximum issue of their
certificates di<i not exceed $24,900,000, of which $7,000,000 were
for the Mstropolitan Bankl^ They were truly a most efficacious
device for improving the financial situation, Thie becomes much
clearer when we realize that the people, feeling the danger of
silver coinage, had withdrawn $33,500,000 in deposits from New
York banks during March and April'. Deposits in national banks
Cs
fell from $1,060,778,388 on April 24 to $979,020,349 on June 20, 1884.
In view of the stringency of the situation, this decline of less
than 10 per cent as compared with a decline of more than 16 per
cent in the crisis months of 1873, is rather surprising,
('^ Cormnercial and Financial c!hronicle. May 24, 1884, p. 621.
Clement Juglar, BRIEF HISTORY OF PANICS, 1916, p, 107.
Ibid., p. 117.
ffj Commercial and Financial Chronicle, May 31, 1884, p, 629,
(oO Charles A. Conant, A HISTORY OF u^ODSRN BAMS OF ISSUE, 1927, p. 662,
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The action of the Clearing House soon ended the crisis.
By the end of June, the decline in values appears to have
reached bottom. The action of the New York banks had saved the
banking difficulties from spreading throughout the country, but
of course it could not prevent the large number of failures which
continued to be reported during June, July, and August with, how-
ever, decreasing frequency and smaller liabilities. By the end
of the year, the liability of the losses had grown to the sum
of $240,000,000. These losses were borne almost entirely by fin-
anciers and speculators rather than by manufacturing and commer-
,
, (O
cial groups.
The crisis appears to have been over by the middle of June
when the balance^ at the Clearing House were again paid in cash.
A number of provincial banks failed for a time but there were no
further failures of large city banks. Factories continued to
shut down and as the summer progressed, railroad earnings showed
that there had been a considerable decline in traffic as well as
in passenger movement. Wages declined, strikes increased in num-
ber and prices not only of commodities, but also of stocks and
bonds, were lower as the nation moved into a short but rather
severe depression.
In looking back upon the crisis of 1884, it becomes appar-
ent that, although the threat of silver tended to undermine con-
fidence in the currency, it could not be said that the currency
(,) Clement Juglar, BRIEF HISTORY OF PANICS, 1916, p. 102
.siBt7 r> Jbabne nooa aruod ani’xaoXO oxlJ}' lo aoiioa srfT
aviiii of aijsaqqti s^xsLarr ni oiitLoQ^ ^9xwt lo bnB arid* •'tfl
aii^ feavAS bad a:^'oi;d ^{'icY .w©H 9di lo aoi^oa sill* ,,,uoiri-o'l JbsrfoaoT
ifi/a ,\,TCJrt£roo adi ^riitwaonge lacSl aaijiiioilYiX) 3nX;ifwi<l
I
'•
^
. rf‘.*
iiolrfw 1o aecuawn sdi” i/istvsiq ton blssoo tt otrutoo lo
i
•jod ,f£uiw tasr^uJi brta ,’cXifT, ^©xuxl. snioi/Jb JbsJioqs*!: ©d bosmitnoo
bne 9dt y/i .e©ii-iXi:<l£iX TeXX^a baa xonabponli ^aidaoio9b ,a©va
HU'S oi" iTwois bad ae.aaol 0dt lo Y^iXic'iftil aa^
~ail xd xlodiino iJ'scuiXfi ©mtod aaavr aaeBoX sedilT .OOOtOCO^Oi^S^i lo
“•I'GunQo Jjms ^xii'xiji’oaloxuics xd nadt 'lodtat ^‘to&aLx!r)0(^e ba^ B'leiCiXfi
V.'N‘
,. V
.aquo-rs UXo
oniX lo slbbici odi xd x©vo xrasd sv^rf od ax^'^sqq^ eiaixo qjII’.
;
.liaiio nx jbiJtjq nio^a axew sauoH. StfiXi-caXO Bdt ta ^©oaaXxid nerlw
oxt 910W B'lBdt tjjd ecixd a xol ii&Ixal aiinocf iaioitivoaq lo 'tedaua A
oi beanltttoo nel'iotoa'K <,Bdnao S!;jx5 lo aa'ii/Xiii^ xdxfdnxrl
Dswoie aaxiisc-xas i>fioxXXfix ,b9a3©X80xq xsmxra oild- se bna nvob tsidQ
sa XXew b& oI'IIbxJ ni BUtloitb eids'idbianov a nood bad snodt tadt
-liiua xif. beBaedotil QB^tLia ,X)9niIo9X> 39^4*^' .txiam&vuia xagaaea^iq ai
baa '<s:^ootB Yo oq1« Xixd ,c»i.tlbofflin90 jo */ino ffor? cooixq bruj led
oiedtm^ txfd txoxle a o&al bB'/cm noltaa. 6Xl3 ae xawol 'iivv taX-cycd
-.oXeaaxqai) 9'£978B
eatijooacf &i ,^eex 'tc aiaxxo odt aoqb sioad gkitiriooX nl
-a 00 OKinnd/jxu; dt btbn»& iBvIla lo tae^dt odt d'sdodtXa ftadt tae
xona’iieo &dt *adt blae &<I ion bljjoo il ^Xbno'ixuo edt ixi oonoblt
.sci
.q ,dxex , aoxtU'f ‘a i ylo'XiilH la'e ''VxalStft (o.
was unsound at this time. The greater cause of the difficulties
was undoubtedly due to an unsound banking system and the unfor-
tunate, but close relationship between a manipulated stock market
and corrupt banking.
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CHAPTER IV
The Crisis of 1895
A. Background
In studying this crisis, it is essential that two things be
kept in mind clearly, first, that it was not just a domestic af-
fair but a part of the world depression of 1891-1893; and secondly,
that the silver question was a vital factor in the crisis and the
economic disruption that attended it*
In a large measure this crisis was an afterclap of the Baring
failure in 1890* British and European investors had purchased mil-
lions of dollars* worth of American and Australian securities. The
discredit which fell upon Argentine and other South American invest
ments with the failure of Barings aroused suspicion regarding other
foreign securities. This resulted in an irresistible movement to
unload such securities and transfer the capital to home investments
While credit conditions in the United States and Australia were in
no wise comparable with the discreditable situation in Argentine,
much of the capital had been invested in unproductive enterprises*
Investments in American industries would have required large in-
terest payments to Europe prior to 1893 if American enterprises had
not, before this time, proved so attractive that the interest upon
them was constantly reinvested*
Since 1884, the United States had gone through a period of
great economic development* The policy of the railroads and the
Prank P. Weberg, BACKGROUND OF THE PANIC OF 1893, 1929, p. 1*
(i) Charles A* Conant, A HISTORY OF MODERN BANKS OP ISSUE, 1927, p* 668
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goveniment of throwing open the west to settlers on generous terms
had been followed by the influx of a large and industrious popu-
lation* The effect was clearly visible during the years from 1886
to 1890 in a rapid e:qpansion of trade and business and the steady
extension of banlc credit. By 1891, the wheat crop was the largest
on record; the cotton, corn and oat crops were tremendous and prices
were good because of the shortage of European harvests for that
year.
With the recovery of European crops, the next year we come to
a climax of three of the chief economic factors that produced a
profound influence in causing the crisis:
a. Heavy load of farm indebtedness due to rapid westward
expansion.
b. Unremunerative prices for agricultural staples particu-
larly the grains.
c. Railroad receiverships caused by unwise and premature
expansion into sparsely settled and unproductive areas.
The shortage of European crops in 1891 had postponed the
crisis in the United States by providing an unea^ectedly large
market for American wheat. With the return of a normal harvest
to Europe, the prices of American farm products, especially wheat,
had declined rapidly. The debt burdens of western farmers and
the railroads dependent upon fairm prosperity for traffic reve-
nues now began to be keenly felt. The decline in farm purchasing
0 W.' Jett Lauck, CAUSES OF THE PAUIC OF 1893, 1907, p. 6.H Ibid, p. 79-80.
( 3 ) 0. W. Sprague, HISTORY OF CRISIS UlTOER THE NATIONAL BANKING SYS
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power meant a decreased demand for eastern manufactured goods
which in turn meant a lesser demand for other raw materials
»
"It has become established that one feature before
and at the outbreak of the crisis in the United States
was the heavy withdrawal of foreign loans. This with-
drawal did not maJse its influence felt here until after
1890* The inflation in the currency, which was occa-
sioned by the issue of silver certificates, beginning in
June 1890, for a time relieved the money market and tended
to postpone the crisis, but rendered it more severe when
it came. Foreign investors feared a change from the gold
to a silver standard with the result that there was a very
heavy withdrawal of foreign investment in 1893."
During the first five months of 1893, the net loss of gold to
Europe was nearly $60,000,000* From the passage of the Sheman
Act in 1890 the Treasury was forced to the necessity of constant
expedients to keep its gold and replenish the amounts lost* Gold
was secured by exchange auid appeals in the autumn of 1892 and the
early months of 1893 to the generosity and patriotism of national
banks, which still held considerable stores*
B* The Silver Question
With the abandonment of the double standard by the leading
nations of Europe and particularly by the German Empire in 1873,
there had naturally resulted a greatly diminished market for sil-
ver*
In the United States, the Sherman Act of 1890 had provided:
"for the compulsory purchase by means of an issue
of legal tender Treasury notes of 4,500,000 ouncts of
silver monthly, at the market price, not to exceea a
Theodore E. Burton, FINANCIAL CRISES, 1902, p* 296*
Q* W* Sprague, HISTORY OF CRISES UNDER THE NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM,1910,
p* 158*
(j) Charles A* Conant, A HISTORY OF jvDDERN BANKS OF ISSUE, 1927, p. 672*
A* Barton Hepburn, HISTORY OF CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1924, p. 27J.,
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a cost of $1*2929 per ounce. Dollars were to be
coined for one year, and thereafter only as they
were required for redemption of notes, which were
made redeemable in gold or silver at the govern-
ment’s option. No greater or less amount of notes
was to be outstanding than the cost of the bullion
and the dollars coined therefrom in the Treasury,
and silver certificates might be issued on the sur-
plus dollars coined. The act also declared it the
purpose of the government to maintain gold and sil-
ver at parity; the fund of lawful money held for re-
demption of notes of liquidating or reducing banks
was ’covered into the Treasury’ instead of being
held as a trust fund, the notes to be redeemed to
be treated as a debt of the United State So’’(^>>
The outlet for the surplus silver displaced by gold in the
currency of European countries was chiefly in India and the far
East. But the East could not absorb all of this and the logical
outcome was a decline in silver. This was first noticed in 1872,
and by 1878, the value of silver had dropped to fl.15 per ounce
or 17 cents below the quotation of 1872* By 1878, the bullion
in a silver dollar was worth only 89 cents. Between July 1, 1891
and January 1, 1892, the circulating medivua had undergone an ex-
pansion of $104,207,636 as a direct result of the Sherman Act*
When the British Government closed the mints of India on
May 31, 1893 to the free coinage of silver, the price of silver
( vJ
dropped from 82 cents to 67 cents per ounce.
For several years prior to the election of Benjamin Harrison to
the presidency, the government had completed its fiscal year with
3 03
(Ok,, Barton Hepburn, HISTORY OF CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1924,p.^
^ W. Jett Lauck, CAUSES OF THE PANIC OF 1893, 1907, p. 18
^>>Ibid., p. 84.
6j>Frank P. Weberg, BACKGROUND OP THE PAiaC OP 1893, 1929, p. 8.
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a comfortable surplus. This, of course, was long before the da^s
of governmental budgets. In some years, this surplus had been
quite large. It was the fiscal policy of the Harrison Administra-
tion to increase government expenditures and cut down receipts from
customs duties and thus eliminate the surplus by balancing income
and expenditures. This policy weakened the resources of the Treas-
ury and thus made more favorable conditions for the play of the
('J
fundamental causes of the crisis.
In 1890, the Treasury gold reserve had been $185,000,000 and
by the time the silver purchase clause of the Sherman Act had been
repealed, this reserve had shrunk to less than $80,000,000 and
there was increasing danger that the United States would be reduced
V
to a silver basis,
"The chief cause, therefore, to which the crisis of
1893 is in a large measure attributable, consisted of a
widespread fear both in Europe and the United States that
the government would not be able to maintain a gold stand-
ard of payments." (d)
C. The Course of the Crisis
This crisis was essentially a monetcLry crisis and its typi-
cal feature was the failure of many banking and financial insti-
(y)tutions.
The first serious disturbance was created when the Philadelphia
W. Jett Lauck, CAUSES OP TEE PANIC OP 1893, 1907, p. 122.
(i) Prank P, Weberg, BACKGROUND OP THE PANIC OP 1893, 1929, p. 61
fS) W. Jett Lauck, CAUSES OP THE PANIC OP 1893, p. 119.
(9) Ibid., p, 119.
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and Reading Railroad failed on February 26. Like many other roads,
the Reading had e:q)anded beyond its resources. It had been a leader
in absorbing Pennsylvania coal properties as well as securing a
foothold in the New England railroad field. The result was the
growth of an enormous floating debt which soon forced the road into
the hanis of a receiver. The immediate effects of the failure were
moderate, but its psychological effect was bad, for it aroused
doubt in the financial world as to the fundamental condition of
(V
other roads and businesses. This of course depressed the stock
market which continued on its downward course throughout March
and April. A contributory feature of this decline was the tend-
(d)
ency to high call loan rates and the contraction of bank loans.
When Cleveland became president for the second term, he urged
the repeal of the Sherman Act, attributing to it the unhealthy
condition of business and the fall of the gold reserve, which was
(vjjust over the $100,000,000 mark.^
By the middle of April, a marked decline had taken place in
the movement of general merchandise and there was an increased
(s)
caution on the part of buyers in placing orders. This feeling
continued to become more pronounced and was intensified by the
knov/ledge that large withdrawals of gold for e:xport continued.
0. W. Sprague, HISTORY OF CRISES UNDER THE NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM, 1910,
p. 163,
j
(o4) Commercial and Financial Chron^le, February 25, 1893, p. 311,
(3) Sprague, HISTORY OF CRISES UNDER THE NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM, p. 163.
(i) Frank P. Weberg, BACKGROUND OF THE PANIC OF 1893, 1929, p. 57,
(^J Commercial and Financial Chronicle, April 15, 1893, p. 628.
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It was also emphasized by ruioors that the Secretary of the Treas-
xiry would exercise his discretion to redeem the Treasury notes
of 1890 in silver, keeping the f100,000,000 in gold for the re-
demption of the old legal tender notes. In every business re-
cession, there appears to be a tendency upon the part of business
men to blame the banks, government, or some outside influence re-
gardless of the amount of effect it may be having upon conditions*
At this time, silver was one of the contributing causes of the
business decline but there appeared to be a growing feeling that
it was the only cause.
On May 4, a drastic decline took place in the stock market
and was followed by further declines during the week of l^y 8#
A marked recession had taken place in s teel production and many
iron and steel prices had touched a lower figure than ever was
known before. On 5, the National Cordage Company failed.
During the latter part of May, news of the failures of many
local concerns in various lines of trade, and the further diffi-
culties among banking institutions in the west and south added
further to the already great apprehension in the east.^^This ap-
prehension was somewhat allayed on Tuesday, June 6, by the an-
nouncement by President Cleveland of his purpose to call an extra
session of Congress between the first and the fifteenth of Septem-
her in an attempt to secure the repeal of the silver law.
^Commercial and Financial Chronicle, April 22, 1893, p. 644.
(^Ibid., May 13, 1893, p. 775.
(3) Ibid., May 27, 1893, p. 888.
(^Ibid., June 10, 1893, p. 946.
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By June 17, another alarming feature had become more evident
with the decline in New York bank reserves. The withdrawal of
funds from these banks was directly due to the large number of
banking failures, both state and national, in the south and west.
The reserve of the New York banks was reduced from $134,000,000
to $110,000,000 and the surplus reserve fell from $24,600,000
to $8,700,000. The distrust of the western banks was spreading
and, although the ability of the New York banks to maintain pay-
ments was not as yet in question, the machinery for the issue of
clearing house loan certificates was set up as a precautionary
measure. It is probably true that if no further banking failures
had occurred, the reserves of the banks would have increased
rapidly because of the general trade depression that was gaining
There had been a vast increase in business failures begin-
ning in May. In June, they had reached imposing figures, while
during the worst week, July 14-21, there were five hundred and
twenty-seven failures as against one hundred and seventy-nine in
the same week of the preceding year. For the whole year there was
an increase of 51.5 per cent over 1892. These failures were re-
flected in the interest rates of commercial paper which were quoted
as high as 12 to 18 per cent during the worst period of the crisis.
(^) 0. W. Sprague, HISTORY OF CRISES UNDER THE NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM,
1910, p. 169.
Ibid., p. 173. .
3^) Frank S. Philbrick, NEfiCANTILE CONDITIONS OP THE CRISIS OF 1893,1893,
p . 93
.
(V/Sprague, HISTORY OF CRISES UNDER THE NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM, p. 175.
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Receiverships among railroads were particularly noticeable
Between June and December, one hundred and fifty-six railroads went
into the hands of receivers. These included such well-known roads
as the Lake Shore, Erie, Northern Pacific, Union Pacific, and Atchi-
son, A good conception of the plight of the railroads is gathered
from the returns of the following year. Railroad earnings declined
Jjl47,390,077 during the year ending June 30, 1894 as compared with
(
the previous year, or 12,07 per cent of the gross earnings.
It was during the third week of July that the second great
3^
wave of distrust of banks spread over the west and south. More than
half the banks of Denver suspended and there were scattered fail-
ures throughout that section. This, of course, stimulated further
withdrawals from New York, News of bank failures in Chicago, Indian-
apolis, Milwaukee, and smaller cities, the failure of the Erie Rail-
road and the resulting decline in the stock market, made the situation
even more critical. It is interesting to note that of the three hun-
dred and sixty national and state banks that suspended during 1893,
with liabilities of $109,547,556, no less than three hundred and forty-
three with liabilities of $96,409,483 occurred in sections of the
west and south.
Suddenly, the banks throughout the country were forced to par-
tially suspend cash payments. Throughout this period, however, the
(/) Warren k, i>ersons , STAT ISTI CSAi. . AHD ' CHRONOLOGICAL CHART—1875-1930,
Charles A, Conant, A HISTORY OF iODERN BANKS OP ISSUE—1927, p, 680.
(^W, C, Mitchell, BUSINESS CYCLES, 1913, p, 56.
D, Noyes, THE BANKS AND THE PANIC OF 1893, 1894, p. 15-16.
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batiks in the reserve cities followed the policy of discounting
freely for all solvent customers. Suspension not only increased
the public distrust, but also deranged domestic exchanges and made
it increasingly difficult to secure money for pay rolls. Hoarding
was certainly increased by the bank restrictions on withdrawals.
Deposits of cash in banks almost wholly ceased and thus made the
situation worse. The hoarding of money was noticeable by the sec-
ond week in August and by the sixteenth of the month, there was a
premium on cash. Before the crisis was over, this premium had
f)
risen in some parts of the country as high as 5 per cent. The
inflexibility of the issue of banknotes under the National Bank-
ing System of course made it impossible for the banks to meet the
situation except by the issuance of clearing house certificates,
partial suspension, or the slower method of gold purchases. The
hoarding of cash and the resultant development of premiums natu-
rally had the effect of causing the iii?)ortation of gold because
of the possibilities of profit. In many communities, the situa-
tion was partially met by the issuance of money substitutes*
The first two weeks of August were the worst for general
trade and undoubtedly the most severe throughout the whole crisis.
When the situation was at its worst. President Cleveland convened
Congress in the extra session, August 7, which he had proposed in
June, In his message he attributed the chaotic condition of busines
(f) 0, W, Sprague, HISTORY OP CRISES UNDER THE NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM,
1910, p. 196.
Ibid,, p. 206.
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to the silver law of 1890 and strongly recommended its repeal. He
pointed out that in three years, the Treasury had lost f132,000,000
(O
of gold and gained $147,000,000 in silver. At this rate, all the
Treasuiy funds would soon he in silver, and the maintenance of parity
between gold and silver would be impossible.
A bill repealing the silver purchase clause of the law of 1890
was introduced in the House,^after a sharp debate, was passed on
August 28 by a majority of 131 votes. Although the Se^te delayed
action until the last of October, the unexpected vote of the House
restored confidence in the co\mtry*s financial integrity and marked
the dose of the worst part of the crisis. By the middle of Septem-
ber, the banicing situation had shown considerable improvement. The
business depression which followed was complicated by the continued
(^)
uncertainty about the monetary standard. While Congress had re-
pealed the silver purchase law, it refused to enact measures which
President Cleveland recommended in order to firmly entrench the
gold reserve.
That the crisis was clearly a banking development of the
western and northwestern part of the country is shown by the fol-
lowing figures. There was a total of 585 bank failures among na-
tional, state, and private banks. Of this number, 215 were in the
west and 147 were in the north west. These banks contributed 59
per cent of the liabilities of all failures. The south held &9
(Ok. Barton Hepburn, HISTORY OF OJRHMCY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1924, p. 350
fj)W. Jett Lauck, CAUSES OP THE PANIC OP 1893, 1907, p. 108.
W. C. Mitchell, BUSINESS CYCLES, 1913, p. 57.
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per cent and the Pacific states, 15 per cent of the liabilities,
while the remainder or 11 per cent was found in the Eastern and
Middle Atlantic states/^ This showing is all the more remarkable
when one considers the wealth and dense population of the east
as compared with the wealth and scanty population of the west at
that time.
In this crisis, far more than in the preceding one, the sil-
ver issue diminished both public confidence and gold reserves to
such a low point that it m^ be said the currency was on an un-
sound basis* The unsoundness of the banking system was reflected
in the extensive bank failures and the nationwide partial suspen-
sion of cash payments. The numerous railroad receiverships, busi-
ness failures, and the rapid decline of prices in the stock market,
seem to be adequate evidence that the stock market was not yet per-
forming its proper functions.
^ Prank S. Philbrick, IvERCAMTILE COKDITIONS OP THE CRISIS OF 1893,(1894,)
p. 106*
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CHAPTER V
The Cri sis of 1907
A. The Trade Boom
During 1905 and 1906, there had been a tremendous world-wide
industrial boom and expansion which was limited only by the bounds
C'J
of civilization. In the United States, this upward movement had
started in 1903 and reached its highest point during 1906. Rapid
advances had been made in agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and
banking. This was a period of reorganizations, great mergers and
combinations that had begun in the latter part of the nineteenth
century and were rapidly growing so strong that President Theodore
Roosevelt had become the champion of the people against them. It
was a period of great stock flotations. The papers were full of
advertisements of mining, oil and miscellaneous ventures, many of
which were undoubtedly fraudulent. Advertising was rapidly becomr
ing recognized as the best and cheapest way of creating a great
volume of sales.
But back of all this growth and expansion there was a general
belief that the country was in the midst of an impregnable pros-
perity. This belief not only fostered extravagant expenditures by
many of the people but it also stimulated an appetite for specula-
tion*
(f) Alexander D. Noyes, ^RTY YEARS OP AMERICAU PINAHCE, 1909, p. 325*
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For many years it had. been a cardinal doctrine in American
banking circles that a crisis like those of 1873 and 1893 would
((>
never again occur in this country* The country was on the gold
standard and the banks were apparently sound and possessed large
resources. Another factor was the failure of forecasts of crises
in 1901 and again in 1903 to amount to much* There was also a
prevalent belief in the twenty-year cycle* This interval had
separated the crises in 1873 and 1857 and those of 1873 and 1893*
The next one, therefore, was not due until 1913*
Optimism was general for the volume of domestic and foreign
trade had expanded month by month throughout 1905 and 1906. In-
dustrial production had grown, prices and wages had risen rapidly,
railroads were finding it difficult to handle the huge quantities
of freight that was offered and the farmers had abundant crops
for which the prices were good* Much of this optimism was undoubt-
edly based upon the gradual rise that had taken place in prices,
over a period of years* This in turn is traceable to increased
gold output* The annual average production of the world for twenty
years ending with 1890, was ^110,544,000* By 1902, this had in-
creased to $221,635,000 and by 1906, the annual production was over
$400,000,000*
B* The Banking Situation
The weed: link in this chain of growth and expansion was the
financial and banking system* Although the United States had
0^ Alexander D* Noyes, FORTY lEARS OP Al/EfilGAN FINANCE, 1909, p* 363*
Charles A* Conant, A HISTORY OP 1/DDEM BAMS OP ISSUE, 1927, p* 703*
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adopted the gold standard, the country still had the national
banking system and its relatively inflexible currency. The nor-
mal condition of the banks was one of lack of preparation for emer-
gencies. They did not have adequate lending pov/er nor did they have
a surplus cash reserve available except during periods of trade de-
pression when there was but a small demand for loans. Another
weakness of this system was its failure to provide a central bank
which, fiunong other things, should supply a central reservoir for
reserves which could not only be used as a basis of credit expan-
sion, but also as a reserve for panics and the resultant bank
(jO
runs that accompany them.
The great industrial expansion overtaxed the money market.
It was necessary to resort to foreign borrowing upon finance
bills on an immense scale. Interest rates continued to rise and
it became harder and harder to sell commercial paper and long
term bonds, Sven the strongest railroads were forced to substi-
tute two- to three-year notes to meet their most pressing capital
requirements. When corporations of the highest standing are ex-
panding upon this basis, it is obvious that they are hankered by
lack of sufficient working capital, that their current obligations
are increasing, and that bank credits are being used to their full-
est extent,
*
The essential unsoundness of this situation appears to have
(/) 0, W, Sprague, HISTORY 0? CRISES UNDER THE NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM,
1910, Po 216.
Barton Hepburn, HISTORY OF CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1924, p.385
<'j)Sprague, HISTORY OF CRISES UNDER THE NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM, p. 238,
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been somewhat obscured by the ease with which the growth of the
trust companies facilitated the shifting of millions of dollars
(/J
of loans and deposit liabilities. As subsequent events proved, if
these trust companies, all of which carried smaller reserves than
the national banks, were forced to contract their banking opera-
tions, it would jeopardize the whole banking structure and make
it necessary for the national banks to go to the aid of the trust
companies with their resources,
C, The Copper Geunble
Under normal circumstances, copper would play an insignificant
part in a crisis. In this case, an understanding of the copper
gamble is necessary in order to realize its far-reaching effect
upon the banking structure.
With the development of industry, telephone, and electric
lighting, there had quite naturally been a greatly increased de-
mand for copper. Several great combinations had been built up
for the mining, refining, and marketing of this metal. To a large
extent, they had been financed by two groups of speculators. The
stronger one, the Amalgamated Copper Syndicate controlled by J, P,
Morgan and sponsored by the National City Bank; the weaker, and the
one which helped precipitate the crisis, the United Copper Coii5)any,
The two leaders in the **pool” which tried to corner the stock of
the United Copper Company were Charles W, Morse and Augustus Heinze,
0, W, Sprague, HISTORY OP CRISES UNDER THE NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM,
1910, p, 228.
Oil.t :.o ri\-'r.o-v^, sxtiit rfoixi-.? £id-xw eajse va 6a*'.xrDa(fo fsosd
s'raIXoh to a::oi^ ' Lv. to 'j 5 .>i?.^xXXr>a't aoi^nqmoo
Vv
\x «i*G.vciq ajiiov:' ti,;v. o; , •;^;'ji:* -i . , txeoq&i) ;;iwol to
xutflt y»Y'iejii:n 'ibi.. 'xi.Ji fcei'ii^o r{?)i:rfw to ilij , issxxixjrraoo va/rcJ’ saoriJf
-c'xsqo ;irti::iRi,’Cl TriauJ- io^iduoo orf bso'io'' i: .fioi::hji;i ©dif
02(x?xa JDita 9i«;Joxf’ite ^crirXxwd eXodw od^ as t.DiaciOSf, Jblxicw ,;uoii'
d-uoT j 91,1 d’ *10 bl.'' 3iiit ot 03 oJ- edn.ad L-irroxJ-ea s?uj 'lot
<,oi’'iriijoao'i T:iarlj dju. 0'5j'.iit
s l.'.x^tev 7©qq oO . Q
ti-iioXt L/x^ ifiiti; na "^Iq JbXx<ow ^©qqo.'; ,e©oni,aJ-fiia^o’tii Xasa-rort 'loi.iVJ
'lOq Too ©d^’ io 9nii)xaatr07«X>r).tf a.hU xil j?. :ti
sdi ©iii^-wo'i oi 79.0'*o ni xsoon ai
.9' ;.;t'jjiX'Xd-B ^iri!i:-.<. :.3d ©d4' .^oqx;
ox7 ;fo 9l© Jjxw ^gnodqblod- ,'{:'xioif/jxii to jii.^iixqoXvTob ©dJ
-aji) ogi.ac/ioi'ti vi-.so7^ a 'luod ai-i.cqi .bxixl ©79a;^
qsf .+iiwcf rtaoc! bad gnoich.'attxd.iuoD I.-^iavoS . _^»qqoo 7ot Jbrusi
a o'i' 3 l ;b to snitod'raK ba& y’^.n'lnTi'j'i ,-j;u.Lfixo: 'xot
Sri-' . 370.talx;c>9q8 to sjqi/cn;
,
owt" \.d J&oo.r'jisiiit nead rix^il
.a .1 "c.u boXXo7 :rtoo f'd-aoibii'^S 'isqquU rietcynasI^iiA arid- 79i*ao7.d-u
odd bna ,7cd.ti9iiy ©d# iriruiS '{diO triri '^ri os703'xo-ie M:' rtasioi!
,\^qia:oO isqqoO .tOoi/iU orit Odd* e^y^i'-jlnoiq .baqXod rioiiimf ar:o
to iIoo:a< odd- 79x:7oo od- riox^b do caw ”Io.'jq-” ,• a;- .ai c'looaoX O'vt od'l’
.aiif'XaH aod-a /:::,!;/A trs ©3-ioK . .. ©.. 0.7 •^f'.-jqiccD xsrqoO x-oJ-xxtU odd-
tianttn: OKI-lHAa JAroiTAK KiA 'licW ‘c'kei n'i ’dr-fT;';::-"Tf -.“ 0
Morse was the owner of a group of New York Banks, whose control
he had sec\n*ed by buying the stock of one bank, borrowing on the
shares, and buying control of another with the proceeds, and then
(')
repeating the operation.
Morse controlled the National Bank of North America, the New
Amsterdam National Bank, the Fourteenth Street Bank and was an
officer in or controlled several trust companies. Heinze was
president of the Mercantile National Bank. The associates of
Llorse and Heinze were all directors or officers of various banks.
Through speculation, the price of copper had been forced
up to a high point of 26 cents a pound in the early part of 1907;
by July, the price had fallen to 20 cents and again to 15g cents
in September. During the latter part of October, it sold as low
as 12 cents a pound with demand decreasing daily. ’Jith the de-
cline in price had come the crash of the whole speculative "pool”
that had played such an inqportant part in forcing the price up-
ward.
D. The Outbreak of the Crisis
The wave of prosperity that preceded the crisis reached its
highest point in the latter part of 1906. But even before that
there had been an indication that the economic growth had been
too rapid and increasingly unstable. The San Francisco earth-
quake of April 18, 1906 had necessitated a withdrav/al of §350,000,000
O) D. W. Perkins, WALL STREET PANICS, 1931, p. 164-165.

of new capital from the money market in order to repair the damr
age done by this terrible catastrophe.
The year 1907 opened with a feeling among far-sighted bankers
that speculation had been carried to extremes and that the only
safe policy was one of conservatism. These feelings were justi-
fied by the subsequent declines in the stock and commodity mar-
kets.
In addition to the decline in the price of copper in the
early months of 1907, other raw materials declined but not to
the extent or with the rapidity of the decline in copper which
had been manipulated to an unreasonably high price. Raw mineral
products such as coal and iron, began to decline after February,
lumber and construction materials after April, while June was the
turning point for producers* goods.
It was widely known that Heinze and Morse were connected
with United Copper Company and it was believed that Heinze as
president of the Mercantile National Bank had taken advantage
of this to obtain loans on his copper stocks. As the price of
copper dropped the alarm of the depositors increased and they
began to withdraw their accounts from the Mercantile national
Bank. These steady withdrawals of funds placed the bank in a
position of having difficulty in meeting its daily balances at
the clearing house with the result that the clearing house
V/. Perkins, V/ALL STREET Pallid, 1931, p. 163.
C. Mitchell, BUSINESS CYCLES, 1913, p. 533.
(f) Ibid., p. 533.
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appointed a comnittee to investigate the condition of the hank.
On Wednesday, October 16, the investigation was con^leted
and pressure was brought to bear on Heinze and his colleagues
to resign. The result of this was startling. Every bank which
had the name of Heinze or Morse as a director ejqperienced a run.
Distrusting their ability to meet the demands of depositors,
these seven institutions appealed to the clearing house for help.
On Sxmday, October 20, a conference of most of the leading bank-
ers was held and it was agreed to help these institutions if
Heinze and Morse and all others connected with the copper specu-
lation would withdraw. It was now felt that a crisis had been
averted and all danger of a panic was over.^'^
The clearing house investigators had made what they thought
was a secret investigation of another bank, the Knickerbocker
Trust Con^jany. In some way, the news of this became public and
it was immediately assumed that this bank was also connected with
the copper speculation. A tremendous run on the bank took place,
clearing house balances were unfavorable and on Monday, October
tv/enty-first, the National Bank of Commerce announced that it
would no longer act as clearing agent for the Trust Company.
Tuesday morning, the Knickerbocker experienced a run that lasted
for three hours or until the bank paid out all the funds it had
—
$8,000,000—and then closed its doors. It was the third largest
f'JD. W. Perkins, ./ALL ^REET PANICS, 19S1, p. 165
W. C. Mitchell, BUSINESS CYCLES, 1913, p. 515.
Ibid., p, 516.
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bank in New York and had $62,000,000 in deposits. On October 24,
the trust congjany went into the hands of a receiver. When it re-
opened after the crisis, it had assets of $51,000,000 of which
$36,000,000 belonged to depositors who were paid in full. If the
conpany had been aided, much might have been spared of what after-
ward became so terrifying and destructive
At this point, J. P. Morgan took a hand in the proceedings
by gathering the bank presidents together at his home. President
Barney of the Knickerbocker Trust Con^pany was also an officer
of the Trust Company of America and it was feared that a run would
start on this bank at any time. Arrangements were made to supply
the bank with all the necessary funds in order to allay the panic.
As had been anticipated, there began on October 23 a tremendous
run on the Trust Company of America, an institution with deposits
of nearly $60,000,000. During the two weeks this run lasted,
$34,000,000 was paid in cash to depositors and in settlement of
checks presented by other banking institutions. Fortunately the
bank avoided suspension. A similar run upon the Lincoln Trust
Conpany speedily reduced its deposits from about $20,000,000 to
about $6,000,000. Inevitably, such events produce their reaction
in the stock market. On Thursday afternoon, October 24, business
came almost to a standstill for lack of "call funds." The aid of
J. P. Morgan was immediately asked for so that the stock exchange
C. A. Collman, OUfi MYSTERIOUS PAIJICS, 1931, p. 265.
W. Perkins, WALL STREET PANICS, 1931, p. 166.
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might not be forced to close because of lack of funds. Mr. Mor-
gan immediately secured a fund of $25,000,000 from the big banks
so that such a catastrophe was avoided.
Loan contraction in this crisis, however, was a compara-
tively slight disturbing factor. IDhe salient feature of this
crisis was the desperate, unreasonable scramble for money. When
on the twenty-fourth of October, the Treasury Department announced
that it was depositing $25,000,000 in the New York banks, it made
no impression on the ever-lengthening lines of people withdrawing
their funds from banks. Nobody seemed to have any faith or reason
left.
The New York Clearing House on October 26 began to issue clear-
ing house loan certificates. The seriousness of the situation is
shown by the fact that $100,000,000 worth of such certificates
were issued in New York alone. This was two and one-half times
f^Jgreater than the amount issued in any previous crisis. Due to de-
clining currency reserves, the banks began to restrict payments
of cash. The New York Savings Banks required sixty to ninety days*
notice for withdrawal of deposits. This made the situation more
complicated for it not only made the circulation of money more
sluggish, but it also tended to stimulate hoarding and the sub-
sequent development of cash premiums. These premiums rose to as
high as 4 per cent in November and did not completely disappear
0 Charles A. Conant, HISTORY OF MODERN BA.NKS OF ISSUE, 1927, p. 714.
0. W. Sprague, HISTORY OR CRISES UNDE.^ THE NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM,
1910, p.299.
r^C. A. Collman, OUR MYSTERIOUS PANICS, 1931, p. 265.
(^jConant, HISTORY OF LDDERN BMKS OF ISSUE, p, 714.
0Sprague. HISTORY OF CRISES UNDIR THE NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM, p. 276,
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until the latter part of the year*
From New York as a center, this feeling of panic spread all
over the country. Runs occurred on hundreds of banks. The gover-
nors of Nevada, Oregon, and California declared legal holidays to
temporarily relieve the situation. Everywhere cash payments were
restricted to some extent.
The consumption of iron dropped from a rate of 27*5 millions
of tons per year to a rate of 12*5 millions of tons within less
than three months. Factories, furnaces, mills, and industrial
machinery all over the country received a sudden check/”^Much of
this was due to the rapid decline in orders, while much more was
due to inability to secure funds to meet expenses unless at a pre-
mium*
Strangely enough the number of business failures during the
crisis were relatively anall, due undoubtedly to the fact that
the banks carried many firms along through the crisis in order
to allay the growth of further distrust. After the first of
January 1908, this number, however, showed a rapid increase.
The effect of the crisis upon the prices of consumers* goods
is interesting. Prices continued to rise slowly and reached a
maximum in October. With the panic conditions prevailing, there
was a rapid decline in the imports, which amounted to $63,000,000
in November and $43s>000,000 in December*
^/jW, C. liitchell, BUSINESS CYCLES, 1913, p. 517.
(oij George H. Hull, INDUSTRIAL DEPRESSIONS, 1911, p. 181
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In 1907, the United States had the largest supply of gold
in the worldo Because of its wide distribution, it was ineffec-
tive in checking the panic* Foreign exchange, fluctuating un-
certainly at first because of the disposition in Europe to sell
and remit American secvirities, turned sharply in favor of gold
imports, and before the end of October, engagements of over
^24,000,000 were announced. Luring November and Lecember, these
were swelled to an aggregate of more than f100,000,000* By the
first of November, the banks had begun to increase their note
circulation rapidly and the arrival of the first shipment of
gold from Europe the ninth of November supplied a further basis
for currency expansion. As further shipments of gold arrived,
the currency continued to expand. In all, f273, 000,000 was
added to the money in circulation between the first of October
and the end of the yearC*^'^
This increase in currency made it increasingly easy for the
banks to pay their depositors. As these demands were met, the
crisis gradually passed off and confidence was restored. Retail
trade continued to be fair until the end of the year. This in
some measure may have been due to the large amount of cash in
circulation and perhaps also to the approach of the Christmas
season as the crisis disappeared with the subsidl&ce of the panic.
Edwin Eernwrer, A. B. t. OF THE FELERAL RESERVE isYSTELi, 1929, p. 6
C. Mitchell, BUSINESS CYCIES, 1913, p. 521,
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V/ith the week ending November 2, when a San Francisco trust
compaiijr with deposits of $9,000,000 failed, there were no further
inportant banking disasters until the crisis was over. As was
shown during 1873-84:-93, the restoration of confidence in the
currency system and the banking system or both marked the end of
the crisis.
In this crisis the unsoundness of the banking system was ap-
parent from its difficulties throughout the crisis. The manipu-
lation of the stock market solely for personal gain was obvious
in the speculation in copper securities. The strength and sound-
ness of the currency stands out in marked contrast to the weakness
of the banking system.
The shortness of the business depression that followed the
crisis seems to show quite clearly that general business was in
a far more sound condition than was the case in either 1873 or
1893 ,(^'^
6,' W, bpra'^’e’,' OF COMllClAL CRISES UNDER NATIONAL BANKING
SYSTEM, 1910, p, 274,
Ibid,, p, 275,
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CmPTER VI
The Crisia of 1920
Ao The Federal Reserve System
The crisis of 1920 differed from its predecessors in one
outstanding particular. Prior to 1920, if either a commercial
or financial crisis took place, the course of events were very
similar; bank runs, bank suspensions and failures, disruption
of domestic and foreign exchanges, and a period of industrial
and commercial chaos that gradually subsided as the banking
system slowly adjusted itself again to the new situation. The
source of much of this difficulty had been in the national
banking structure with its limited note issue and its lack of
organized centralized leadership during periods of stress. No
doubt the increasing volume of business transacted through checks
tended to lessen the use of bank notes during periods of good
business and general public confidence but would have made the
situation more stringent during periods of economic upheaval
when public confidence in the banking struct’ore is at a low
ebb.
The Federal Reserve System tended to eliminate these evils
by:
a. Providing for currency expansion through use of go-od
securities and gold as a basis of note issues#
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b. Providing for currency and credit in central reser-
voirs for use during periods of expanding business as
well as during periods of difficulty and uncertainty.
c. Providing centralized organization whose keynote was
strength and public confidence.
d. Providing the most effective use of the country’s mone-
tary gold.
This new system made possible a poolihg of the nation’s finan-
cial resources during crises that hitherto£«i=e had been accomplished
only by small groups of large city banks. While it is true that
the Federal Reserve System did not completely eliminate the evils
found under the National Banking System, it did much to minimize
their effect upon fundamental economic conditions.
B . The War Period in American Economic Development
It has been said that all great wars have disclosed an un-
imagined economic power in the possession of every nation. This
was true of the United States particularly after her entrance into
the war although the foxmdations had been laid during the period
when we were supplying the warring nations with finances and sup-
plies.
With the entrance of the United States into the war in 1917,
the output of American agricultural and industrial products in-
creased more rapidly than they had from 1914-17. This expansion
0 Alexander !d. Noyes, .vAR PERIOD IN AMERICAN FINANCE, 1926, p. 4.
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was centered in the production of those things which war operations
require in volume: wheat, cotton, meats, metals, nitrates, chemi-
cals, textiles, and leather. By 1918, the wheat crop was 280,000,000
bushels or 44 per cent greater than in 1917 while the iron and steel
industry aided by an enormous ship building program and extensive
armaments and munitions demand grew by leaps and bounds.
In many circles it was expected that the closing of the war
would bring a drastic curtailment in this tremendous nationwide .
expansion. Even though the United States had become the financial
center of the world it was believed that the reaction would be
severe. When the war ended in November 1918, there was a relapse
in prices during the early weeks of 1919. Retail purchasing pov/er
due perhaps to the high wages that had been paid throughout the war,
did not appear to have been appreciably checked. Prices again rose
and purchasing power appeared to increase with them.
Signs of unprecedented lavish spending appeared as business
men enriched by war contracts and working men erroneously believ-
ing themselves to have ''similarly enriched by the war-time rise of
v/ages, spent freely.
Prices and production continued to increase. The 1919 wheat
crop was larger than that of 1918 and the price higher. By Christ-
mas week of 1919, the price had risen to a new high of nearly ^3.50
^Alexander D. Noyes, WAR PERIOD OF AMERICAN FINANCE, 1926, p. 297-8
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a bushel. The cotton crop was the greatest since 1914, and yet it
sold at prices 6 per cent above the highest of war time. Wages also
continued to rise and the man who had received $3 to |3.50 during
the early war period could now command f6 to $10. Even with this
increase, the wages of labor did not keep pace with the cost of liv-
ing which in June of 1919 was 77-g- per cent above that of 1913. By
December, this had increased to 99 I/3 per cent and in June of 1920,
1it was 116-g per cent. The fact remains, however, that the average
workman did not appreciate this. What appealed to him was the fact
that he had more money in his hands than ever before—and he spent
it freely.
During this time, the monetary currency had increased from
(«i)
$3,419,000,000 to $5,468,000,000 in 1920. The war years brought
in a tremendous amount of gold—the monetary gold stock rising from
$1,905,000,000 at the beginning of 1914 to $2,942,000,000 at the
beginning of 1921. During the same period, there was an increase
(j)
of 16.2 billion dollars in bank deposits or 118.6 per cent. These
increases in gold reserves and bank reserves made possible the
rapid rise of prices.
As prices rose, the belief began to grow that there would be
a shortage of comraodities in the near future. The total surplus
exports over imports during 1919 in the trade with Europe alone,
was over four billion dollars. Trade v/ith Asia and South America
^Alexander D. Noyes, V/AR PERIOD OF AMERICAN FINANCE 1926, p, 301.
Lloyd M. Graves, GBEAT DEPiiESSION AND BEYOND, 1933, p.22.
M. Anderson, ’*Two »New Eras* Coiapared,** (i.e. 1896-1903 and 1921-28),
Chase Economic Bulletin, February 11, 1929, Vol. IX, No. 1.
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was also booming. Business all over the world was good. Specu-
lators in commodities increased, business men accumulated inven-
tories, producers of raw and finished products were slow in sell-
ing. liuch of this speculation appears to have been based on the
assumption that credit so\n*ces which made possible accumulation
of goods by domestic and foreign merchants could be indefinitely
extended and that purchasing capacity of consumers was unlimited.
The facts that the credit resources of the world were strained to
the limit and that much of the world had been impoverished by the
World War were either not seen or ignored. As these beliefs be-
came widespread, prices continued to rise and make the whole struc-
ture upon which they rested more and more precarious. To anyone
familiar with economic history, the world and the United States in
particular was approaching a crisis in finance and conmerce.
C. The Spread of the Crisis
This speculative craze had been as rampant in the East as in
America. American demands for Japanese silk had caused the price
to rise to over fl8 a pound. Early in April 1920, the cables
brought the nev/s of the disastrous collapse of the speculative
craze in Japan. This liquidation v/as followed by a securities
market liquidation in the United States. In May the price of 4*
per cent Liberty Bonds which had been sold at par, fell as low
as 82 and even the Victory Bonds whose maturity was only three
years av/ay sold below 95o ^
^Alexander t). Noyes,”,VAR tBRIOt) OP AMEHICAN FINANCE, 1926, p. 342.
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Comnodity prices did not begin to show a real decline until
Jvuae. The reason for this is partially explained by the follov/-
ing excerpt;
"There is a movement from the farm to cities. Men
refuse to work on farms at poor pay. They would rather
be idle in cities. The result is that there will be a
24,000,000 acre shortage in wheat this year. The de-
creasing food supply is a very alarming situation. Never
has the agricultural situation been so serious. There is
a prediction of high prices for farm products. Season is
late and labor scarce.
"The supply of farm labor in the United States this
year, the Bureau of Crop EstiiLates reports, is only 72
per cent of normal, whereas, the demand is 53 per cent
above normal. This shortage is due to the demand for
labor in manufacturing districts, the lack of immigra-
tion, and the departure from this country of natives
of Europe. Notwithstanding the fact that there is a
wider use of power machinery cn the farm, which should
reduce the cost of production, the high cost of labor
makes it more expensive to the farmers than under the
old conditions.
This situation is partially explained by the fact that wages
in 1920 were by this time 30 per cent higher than in 1919
The fall in commodity prices began in liiay 1920 and continued
throughout 1921 until January 1922. Those commodities which had
enjoyed the greatest boom during the war were the ones which suf-
fered the most drastic declines. This v/as particularly true of
wheat which fell rapidly, even though the harvest was 135,000,000
bushels smaller than that of 1919. It continued to fall until it
reached a low of ^1 a bushel in November 1921. Wool declined from
66 cents to 40 cents a pound frcm March to October. The price of
Literary Digest, Jiay 22, 1920, p. 17-8.
^)lbid.. May 22, 1920, p. 19.
(yj Alexander D. Noyes, WAR PERIOD OP AMERICAN FINANCE, 1926, p. 324
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rubber fell 50 per cent, sugar dropped from 21 cents to 8 cents
a pound, and coffee sold for nearly a third of its former price.
The cancellation of orders attracted more attention in 1920
0)
than in any earlier crisis. This added greatly to the confusion
of the liquidation and no doubt tended to make matters worse. While
cancellation was prevalent in the United States, it was particu-
larly evident in exports to Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Cuba, and
other southern markets. Great volumes of goods already exported
were refused by South American merchants and thrown back on the
hands of American shippers or left on the wharves to deteriorate.
By the end of 1920, the resultant losses were estimated to be not
less than fl50,000,000. This is partially explainable by the
rapidity and extent of the fall in prices of the exports of South
America—name ly, sugar, coffee, wheat, and beef. The people had
found their incomes diminished so that it would have been impossible
for them to pay for imports at fancy prices.
The rise in prices before the crisis had caused people to buy
in expectation of further increases. As prices continued to fall,
people refrained from buying evidently believing that prices would
be lower. This was characterized as a nation-wide strike against
the high cost of livingl"*^ It had the desired effect, for as the
movement spread, retail merchants continued to lower their prices.
These retail prices fell only about 15 per cent, however, as compared
CYClfflS AUD lMEbIPLOYl!.IEWT
, 19^, p. 114.
pj Alexander B. Noyes, WAR PERIOD IN AMERICAN FINANCE, 1926, p. 393-4.
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to a decline of 45 per cent in wholesale prices up to the spring
(')
of 1921.
The crisis of 1920 was concerned so much with commodities
and speculation in commodities that it really lasted longer than
euay of its predecessors due to the length of time consumed in the
fall of commodity prices. While this recession began to manifest
itself in June and did not cease for nearly a year and a half, the
major portion of the liquidation appears to have been completed by
the middle of November.
Earning statements shov/ed a falling off by the end of the
summer. Business failures increased over 1919 but were less
than one-half as great in number as those in 1921. Unemploy-
ment increased quickly, for by the first of January there were
nearly 3,500,000 fewer workers employed than the year before.'
The heavy industries, such as iron and steel, automobile, and
building trades were the hardest hit. Reduction in employment
was a phenomenon affecting most severely the establishments of
the largest size. The reason for this is not clear. Wages were
fairly well maintained particularly when compared with the change
in prices. There is good ground for believing that the depression
which lollowed was almost twice as acute as that of 1908.
It is interesting to contrast the banking situation during
the crisis of 1920 with those that preceded it. Due to the
O) W. W. Jennings, HISTORY OP ECONOkIC PROGRESS IN UNITED STATES, 1926, p. 717
y4>Ibid., P. 718. n
5) 5 G»nv, BUSINESS CYCLES AND UNEI.IPLOrx.iENT, 19l3, p. 97.,
y) 1 0 id . , p . 59 .5
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Federal Reserve’s machinery of note issue on commercial paper,
there was no panic of bank depositors, no hoarding of money, no
cash premium, no issuing of clearing house certificates. In the
twelve months ending with June 1921, there were only twenty-eight
national banks that failed. In every instance these were small
institutions with less than ^100,000 capital, mostly located in
sparsely settled districts of the west and south.
It seems reasonable to believe that had the situation of
1920-1921 arisen under the National Banking System, the crisis
would have had a tremendous financial repercussion that would
have been far more disastrous than that of 1873, 1893, or 1907
because of the world-7/ide nature of the credit and industrial
expansion, 'fhe Federal Reserve System by facilitating liquida-
tion through a strong banking structure enabled the after-war
deflation to run its course in a relatively short space of time
so that by the end of 1921, business was able to look forward to
a quick recovery.
Although the sound banking system facilitated rapid liqui-
dation, it should have had some control that would have checked
the excessive speculation in commodities from taking place. Com-
pared with the situation during any previous crisis, the currency
was relatively more sound, due to the tremendous increase in gold
reserves since 1914. The stock market, however, still failed to
serve its function as a roarket for capital.
(,) Alexander b'. Noyes, V'AR PERIOD IK AMERICAN FINANCE, 1926, p. 407
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CHA.PTER VII
The Stock Market Crisis of 1929
A. The Background of the Boom
The period from the depression of 1920-1921 until the crisis
of 1929 has undoubtedly been the greatest period of prosperity
in the history of the nation. The prevalance of the belief that
American industry had succedded in eliminating the tremendous de-
viations of the business cycle was far more prevalent in 1929 than
in 1907. But there was considerable justification on the part of
the masses for this belief if not on the part of many economists
who, in hearty endorsement of the idea, had forgotten their econom-
ics because they were so swayed by psychological factors.
"Each of the crises experienced in the United States
in the last one hundred years have sprung from different
causes; have had different symptoms; the results have never
been quite the same,"(^
That this statement is true, there can be no doubt. The cir-
cumstances leading up to the crisis of 1929 were more diversified,
more general, and more complicated than those which have character-
ized the crises that have preceded it.
"The great break in commodity prices in 1920-1921 re-
leased a large volume of bank credit that had been employed
in commercial loans, and bank credit in the United States
would have declined instead of expanding, after 1921, had
the outside world been in a position to draw away our excess
of gold. But the outside world had been driven off the
gold standard, and, through the workings of Gresham’s Law,
continued to send us gold instead of taking gold from us.
We have thus had available for uses other than commercial
0) Carlton A. Shively, Outlook, November 13, 1929, p. 426
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loans not only the whole of our increase in bank credit since
1921, but also a substantial part of the bank credit out-
standing at the beginning of that year. Chief a^iong these
other uses have been real estate loans, installment finance
paper, bank investment in securities, and collateral loans
against securities, • 0
By the time the depression of 1920-1921 was over, the ariqy had
been completely demobilized. Within the next few years, not only
were these men absorbed by industry, but the entrance of women into
industrial and professional occupations was even accelerated. In-
tense promotion became the feature of the land, The automobile in-
dustry which had been relatively in its infancy during the war, grew
by leaps and bounds. The production of petroleum, petroleum prod-
ucts, and rubber expanded to meet the needs of the automobile in-
dustry, The greatest building boom that the nation has ever seen
furnished a tremendous basis for further industrial expansion. Real
estate loans increased from f230,000,000 in 1920 to $1,286,000,000
in 1928; The consolidation, extension, and construction of public
utilities created a new demand for electrical and power equipment.
The invention of the radio made further expansion necessary. The
chemical industry which had been fostered by the war grew rapidly.
The development of packaged foods brought great changes and im-
provements in retail trade. High wages and larger incomes created
a demand for motion pictures, silk eind rayon clothing, and other
luxuries that caused great expansion in these fields. There was
also extensive activity in mergers, combinations, reorganization,
0) M, Anderson, ”Two ’New Eras ’ Compared” , (ile, 1896-1903 and 1921-28)
Chase EconoLiic Bulletin, February 11, 1929, Vol, IX, No, 1, p, 485,
pjLloyd M, Graves, THE GREAT DEPxlESSION AND BEYOND, 1933, p, 49,
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and recapitalization of industries. Within this tremendous and
diversified development lies the basic cause of the crisis.
”Ko one can ever actually tell just when production
is being overdone, especially in an ever-growing country
possessed of such great natural resources as the United
States.” (f)
This growth and ^spansion required enormous amounts of new
capital. The highly publicized campaigns to sell liberty bonds
and other governmental securities during the war had undoubtedly
done much to make the people more financial and stock market minded
tha^ they had been before the war. Another factor was undoubtedly
the installment selling of stock to employees by many industrial
and public utility corporations. The issuance of rights by many
companies in order to secure new capital was another factor. During
the first ten months of 1929, companies listed on the Uew York
stock exchange alone acquired ;|2, 319, 302,000 through right financing.
Billions of dollars* worth of stocks and bonds were sold to people
who, prior to 1920, put all their funds in the savings bank.
As the paper or real profits of these early investors in-
creased, they bought more securities and told their friends of
their good fortune. Speculation and the manipulation of stocks
by means of pools drove prices upward so that by 1929 many stocks
were selling from ten to one hundred and fifty times higher than
their earnings justified. Those who were hesitant about purchas/»«
(» E. H. H. Simmons, PRINCIPAL CAUSES OF THE STOCK I.IARKET CRISIS OP 1929,
1930, p. 9.
^
4) D. W. Perkins, WALL STREET PANICS, 1931, p. 179
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individual stocks or wished to diversify their risk, purchased the
securities of investment trusts, others believed that they were
doing the same thing in purchasing the securities of holding compan-
ies, In September, the last month of the boom, investment trusts
and holding companies successfully marketed ^650,000,000 in new
securities. As profits grew, speculators added to the wave of
prosperity by lavish spending. They purchased new automobiles,
built larger and finer homes, and surrounded themselves with many
luxuries. The building was financed largely on credit for no
stock market speculator would purchase a house outright if he felt
that an increase in market profits would pay for his new home in
a few weeks.
Obviously all this speculation had a tremendous effect upon
the credit structure of the nation,
”From 1921 to 1929 there was an absolute decline
in bank holdings of commercial paper, the *all other
loans and discounts of the National Banks having dropped
from 9,025 millions of dollars to 8,745 millions of dol-
lars between June 30, 1921 and June 30, 1928.*’ 0=^
’’Combined stock and bond collateral loans and bank
investments in securities for National Banks in 1921
were 41.9 per cent of the total loans and investments
and for 1928, they were 55 per cent. For the report-
ing member banks of the Federal Reserve System, the
percentage of stock and bond collateral loans and bank
investments in securities to total loans and investments
was 46,2 per cent in 1921, and this had risen to 60.3
per cent in 1928,”/^
Brokers loans increased from $719,000,000 in August 1921 to
a peak of $6,804,000,000 on October 2, 1929l^This increase was
undoubtedly the chief cause of the great credit stringency of 1929
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for the money loaned out on call loans to brokers was contributed
not only by the New York banks but banks throughout the country and
all over the world. Individuals and corporations also contributed
to the call-loan mai'ket. Nationally business could not afford to
pay the rates of interest that call loans commanded so that it suf-
fered as a result. During the summer of 1929, the call-money rate
was above 15 per cent.
Strangely enough, however, and the thing that makes this cri-
sis so different from those that had preceded it, was the fact that
commodity prices had risen but little. After the depression of
1920-1921, prices had risen but had remained comparatively stable
since 1922. Since the crisis it has become increasingly clear that
this high price level, even though stable, was really artificial
and was in large measure due to the vast amount of gold which came
into the United States during and immediately after the war. Serv-
ing as a basis of bank credit expansion, the effect of this tremen-
dous gold reserve was to stabilize prices in the United States while
prices in Western Europe were falling as the nations struggled to
adopt some form of the gold standard. With no inflation in com-
modity prices, it is clear that the boom in business had received
considerable stimulus from the activity in the stock market. Un-
fortunately, the stock market situation was decidedly precarious
due to the inflation that had taken place there. By the summer of
^Irving Fisher, STOCK MARKET CRASH,—AND AFTER, 1920, p. 4.
(-^'Ibid., p. 182.
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1929, with financial centers all over the world contributing to the
call-loan market in New York and receiving high rates of interest in
return, there can be no doubt that a crash in prices must come shortly*
The extreme to which the market had gone is shown by the rise in the
most active group on the exchange*
"Industrials in the New York Times Averages showed
an increase from a low of 66*2 in 1921 to a high of 365.9
in 1929 or a 452,7 per cent increase."
The blindness of the speculators to the excesses to which the
market had gone no doubt was one of the causes which made it ex-
ceedingly vulnerable early in the fall of 1929,
B. The Outbreak of the Crisis
Early in March 1929, the stock market registered a considerable
decline but quickly recovered so that the crisis was postponed until
the fall*
In August, the banking house of Clarence Hatry failed in Eng-
land with liabilities of ^67,500,000 and the subsequent investiga-
tion disclosed that Hatry had been party to a gigantic forgery of
stock certificates. Prior to this time, the English stock market
had enjoyed a tremendous boom. The failure of Hatry precipitated
a rapid decline in the London market and caused coincident rapid
declines in stock prices in the Berlin and Paris exchanges as well
as considerable liquidation in New York, The Hatry failure not only
Cpreceded but was an actuating cause of the American crisis,'
(i) Benjamin M, Anderson, "Two New Eras* Compared", 1929, p, 8. (Chase BuL .
Irving Fisher, STOCK MABKET CRASH, 37 1930, p, 31.

During the early part of the suminer, industrial activity in the
United States began to decline. At first it was felt that this de-
cline was merely due to seasonal causes but within a few weeks it was
apparent that there were factors other than seasonal. Sales of auto-
mobiles showed a pronounced decline while in many industries, invento-
ries began to accumulate. Business was still fundamentally sound but
there was a growing feeling that a minor business recession was to
be expected in 1930. Throughout this period the market continued to
advance and reached its peak during the first week of September and
then declined slowly until the end of the month. Feeble efforts
were made to check this liquidation but it continued during the early
weeks of October®
The first sharp break came on the third and fourth of October
but was quickly checked for people bought eagerly in the belief that
they had secured an opportunity to pick up bargains. After this
short recovery, the market continued its slow but inevitable course
downward. This continued with serious breaks on the fifteenth and
the twenty-second of October punctuated with sharp but short advances.
It was now thought that the market had seen the worst of the reces-
sion; the price decline had strengthened the position of many stocks,
brokers had demanded increased margins so that the danger of forcing
additional securities on the market by declining margins had been
materially reduced; last but not least, there had been no banking or
brolserage failures in this co\mtry.
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On Wednesday, October 23, a wild scramble to sell stocks
began* This continued the next day but was more orderly* So
many issues were being dumped on the market that a conference
of influential bankers was hastily called at the office of J*
P* Morgan and Company* After a brief conference, they issued a
statement to the effect that they believed the market to be fun-
damentally sound. Reports were circulated that a billion dollar
pool had been organized to stabilize the market* These reports
tended to discourage bear raids and to partially quell the fears
C'J
of investors* The continued pouring of securities into the mar-
ket, however, soon offset what little suppoirt might have been
offered, and the day closed with over twelve million shares hav-
ing changed hands. It was the most staggering day in the market up
to that time*^^
To allay the feeling of panic that was spreading, the bank-
ing interests appeared to have stepped in on Friday, the twenty-
fifth and momentarily, at least, checked the liquidation for the
volume of selling was only one-half that of the previous day*
By this tiiiiS, thousands of accounts had been closed. People
who had started with only a few hundred dollars to take a "flyer”
and then put everything they owned into the market in the belief
that they would make a fortune, now found themselves penniless*
Sunday was spent by the brokerage houses in bringing their accounts
/•)i* «* Perkins, WALL STREET PAI'TICS, 1931, p. 182
(4) Ibid*, p. 183*
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up to date and Wall Street was as busy as though it were a regular
business day*
That the previous week’s liquidation had scared the whole
nation was shown when the market opened on Monday* Selling
orders had accumulated from all over the land during the week-
end, as people, determined to ease their minds by getting out
of this nerve-wracking speculation, ordered their brokers to
sell. A tremendous flood of liquidation was loosed and prices
dropped precipitately*
The next day, Tuesday, October 29, opened with slight gains
over Monday’s close but the liquidation soon got underway in
the most devastating day in the history of the stock market. The
declines wiped out speculators by the thousands. When the ses-
sion had closed, 16,410,030 shares had been sold, breaking all
records. A group of bankers under the leadership of J. P. Morgan
and Con^any sought to bring order out of the chaos, but without
success. The demand for more margin by brokers led people to
frantically try to raise funds. Newspapers reported that New
York pawn brokers turned away hundreds eager to raise almost
A/
anything on jewels and silver'. John D. Rockefeller’s statement
that he was buying stocks, and several dividend actions, to-
gether with the belief of the most experienced financiers that
the worst was over, aided somewhat in attracting the public back
into the market*
(V^Pinancia'l and Commercial Chronicle, November 2, 1929, p. 2726.
Z&OLiterary Digest, November 9, 1929, p. 7.
iiJU. W* Perkins* WALL STREET PAI-IICS, 1951, p.
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When the exchange opened on Wednesday, there was an eager-
ness to buy stocks where before the only desire was to get rid
of them. Stocks advanced several points and the next day this
advance continued. The exchange was closed on Friday and Satur-
day in order that brokers and their clerks might straighten out
their accounts and secure a much needed rest. The declines con-
tinued moderately until November 13, and then continued to rise
(0
for the balance of the year. The panic phase was over but there
was still a grave crisis in industry.
The number of people who had invested and speculated in the
stock market was tremendous and their losses overwhelming. It
seems impossible that economists, financiers, bankers, and busi-
ness leaders should not have realized that when such millions of
people sustain losses, even if these are only paper losses, they
do not tend to spend as freely as they had prior to their losses,
but rather to curtail expenses as much as possible. While up
to this time, business had been good but declining slowly, it
seems almost incomprehensible that supposedly coii5)etent observ-
ers should reason as follows:
”The depression in Wall Street will affect general
prosperity only^he extent that the individual buying
power of some stock speculators is impaired.”
"ITo Iowa farmer will tear up his mail order blank
because Sears Roebuck stock slumped. No Ifenhattan housewife
took the kettle off the kitchen stove because Consolidated
Gas went down to 109. Nobody put his car up for the winter
,
because General Motors sold 40 points below the year *3 hlgh.”‘*^^
Irving tisher, S^OCK MARKET CRASH--^ AFTER, 1930, p. 3
(^Literary Digest, November 9, 1929, p. 6*
n '
.i< ^ •'^oc;o 't:
#
o-c'.J- :Tac»
iin t99 c* Trtw O'ri ;•>'
.
o ^^: ' ;^‘:i9dw s.-o ;* '; :-.*. o-r
til ’b S. .^•. ;»ji^ '.::k '. tr > . “‘r'jy^jR : ii nncvJbi^ ’ . •. ;-.'4'
.
'
-. t;^;
..Ciij /'[>/•'; ^ :v ,
‘70 fteirti; !.<':.}' cylv r.i 'lo '... . ‘:-:o'-c. j i
••
.
;s '. i-'- ''''' r.r^
^.^iT jt ^£..'7? xr^i'wv . •' ' jrTr . . '^,1 vO-u
l>
)
^'id
-'i.’v; ^ ' -•'!v .'T£9'{; -C.' :• -- J 'O.!
* Jtaint a
gf!;' *1' f'-HB ,'.03 •: 7 'I C'1':’ ej.iiC.'C b.0 7 .'; j.'fT
;
-
•
‘ a^eaoX 'lisfl ^'u^, -.::chr: sx;v. . . .-ai
-x;..;.
^ ,
' xaoitoDC ?r!S«e
'Ao - I'.'i '.J.,-^
.
. ,
: ‘ i'-i'it .7}si X I >4 » (1 V'AX^ "toxi bf.'J'. iC aw>«w*.
i \i7 vi i ;i£viJXt6
.1 :. ' r'.,' .' . ,!.: br!?'i7 ot Jbtneu 7j.; cJb
>ix; ftU '• I J.^ fxo o.t •xsx.'ifti
sx ,-'..,70 l^ ;../ Lx ' , r:? 9 <i b;-}^. , 5-. , xx cj
V. . X '-JV vli 1 :-X7d 7 ' OCfXL Hfu%»C
:
• r
, xo'' ni' •'JC^ 7 X': f,'.,.
'" Vo
t-vx'l.x Uiw i. •.. -iL nr-lx.''
'..x[;.*^x • '• -1 >r{3' . - T .
. 'ZlKiiial bi 1^ 1 . -
III Tflti- -Cl tTf 'x?x-o': •. ..
:
.Ljqnv.Iu ixx . .;x . 7;.- ' '>.-7
'. O^ti XrCA'x^lJi C/iw,*- ''cbx'f
'
'.
-
• Hocr
xlf! rt-j/q v^OMO . --- '^'<1 i vofj « ; j.r
uv -::^'<5 0** f. - U’v'o;.. -•x-;!?' •..xu/r:-
t
^ • n
V (
L ^
Even such an astute economist as Professor Irving Fisher
perhaps because he was too close to the situation, failed to
realize that this stock market crash had differed from any of
its predecessors in that practically everyone who had any money
to invest had suffered, and that the losses had not been con-
fined to a few professional stock market speculators as in the
past. As late as December 15, 1929, when the crisis had been
past and business was on the verge of depression he wrote;
"But the threat to business most feared, namely,
the 26 billion dollar deflation in listed paper values,
so full of sound and fury, signifies little. It is
now more universally recognized that in the fall of
paper values, there had been merely a transfer of wealth,
not a destruction of any physical wealth, even if there
ware a lowered valuation."
And:
"This is because the crisis, unlike the 1920
crisis was not a violent fall of an inflated commod-
ity price level. Business stoppage and unemployment
could hardly follow a stock panic, because such a case
wipes out profits and substitutes losses, and no con-
cern can afford long to run at a loss. But such a loss
could hardly follow a stock panic." (*)
During and immediately after the panic, business leaders
iiijuea. Btatements to the effect that business was good, wages
high, commodity price levels firm. But in the face of all this
the fact was inescapable that business was slowly but surely de
dining. Imnediately after the panic, a series of conferences
were held at the ^JThite House between President Hoover and farm
(f) Irving Fisher, oTOCK lOHKET CitASH—AND AFTER, 1930, p. 61
S^ixvtl. itcasfiloa’i -a 4c.r>J50oe 9i-;.^aja n* douz nev^
o^ i)«Ii:£'J iiii oS aaoXo oot aaw arf ©ewaoacr uqeii.iaq
Ic {fra iuoil fcs'jsl-ifi X’jmI xlt3*J.o 3Joc:‘'C ajy;t 951139*1
Xsno^a '(/m iwid orfv bno\;i€V9 ’^IIi^ol^03*i<i .ni e*rotiy©c«Xa^q e^i
•“jioo £i90<X tori Xufii saei-oX 9dt bc^ ,Xt'‘i&Hws bAd tfiSYtii oJ
Qdt Lik Ea teolrraci Jloota XanoxEBSloiq wel; a ot btnil
.lesti bad aieiio ©fit nt3i,iw ,S^ei ,51 Aeclaeciefl sa ©tai uA , ta*m
;eto*iw od nolaao'xqai) 'io ©'^isv arft cio eaw cti*5f'i:8ifd Jba^
c.s©rtiiiiid oi t3©*ait sit tjjff"
^r,er/J.3V 'T-sqsq betati xii ncitalloJt) “Xiillcft noilXid dS sdt
Bi tX .rlttXi csl’iXf'al- ^wia iiowos lo Xlx'l 06
"io XTal ad'+ nl tarft r95iiig,oo6'r ''CXXaa'xovXxiu s'lctu «oa
,fltXa'?V ^0 ';6'ty£f3iJ a need twi cisdt
,
,'j&juX*jy ii^qaq
r;;,edt \1 m-.'f:- ^diLAffK Xx-siu-'^dq lj,rta lo ttcitoxxitesXi a ton
”.ficiM2t.'Xav -laiorfoX a 9i6w
; b:^i.
0?>^l Oifr .wtai'ro DdJ oQXfjaoad oi aXd*’'
-icsx oo Xvtj?X'ini o; "lo XXa*t trroIoXv a toK saw -iiaiio
dfie«r';cX<it:e:w Xixa eftoaisj-i. .x'-vel onliq
sfcac a d'lisa f^*ii<e.c>&c »oij«iq ?(pota a t/oXXoI xiXujxri ^XifOo
“i^vo oci bn ' ,'.'Ousox iiS.'-jjtitadi/e i>ite •idX’Jciq ti/o aoqxYi'
-eoi r. 'Jci/e t.' .’ . ,oi >= +*j flirx ot ^:uiol i)ioTi^a .tay xii^o
’'.Dinxq t'ccta a vollo'.* "IX'tafl r roa
azibatL iC©a'
_. tOifi-iq ©fit tot"3 •^tXetalXitfni.'.j: Xiw jxiiI'U'S
*'>
sej^aw ,f)oo^ "isir ceeii/i-x/d xadt sdt ot etncoetafe. xyx/bai
«
idt XXa lo 9031 9dt ai aXsvoX eoi*iq 'itiXccoii.',
,
.tid
-iw voijxa isjd yJvcLa 33w . ’.oxiieud tj:*dt oXtiaqf'.rusai bjsw Qdi
lioone'r&latoo ‘to aoi'xoe .o <yixix;;i odt lotla \,X©t3iXQirciJ ..yfixnlXo
/aWi Ana *iaToctr;. J-asAxe©*!*! no^.7tecf etKaii edt ta Lied.
,
L' 5r5A CBfi. --luX 'o' XxLi-.AlTyr^bS , 'XtTlei'i r' Ji v^Ilb .q
organizations, leaders of industry, railroad executives, repre-
sentatives of labot unions, and building leaders. At these con-
ferences was laid the basis of the first comprehensively organ-
ized and officially directed attempt at controlling economic forces
which had ever been undertaken in the United States, The first
step was taken to restore national confidence. Industrial lead-
ers promised not to cut wages, labor unions agreed not to strike,
easy money was assured by repeated cuts in the discount rate sup-
ported by heavy Federal Reserve buying in the open market, the
Federal Government promised f160,000,000 tax reduction, a huge
public workj^ program, and loans to shipping coicpanies for con-
struction of vessels. The nation was flooded with the propaganda
of optimism. Leaders in public and industrial life predicted
the early return of prosperity. Henry Ford went a step farther
and advanced wages, Local^ state, municipal, and county govern-
ments v/ere urged to throw into the waning stream of demand all
the public business they could.
With the announcements of unified and cooperative action by
the government, industry, and labor, the crisis appears to have
been definitely over. Liquidation had ceased and the stock mar-
ket moved slowly upward throughout the remainder of the year and
during the early part of 1930. Unfortunately, the program had
been based on the assumption that business was fundamentally
(/) Lloyd M. Graves, GRE^iT DEPRESSION AKL BEYONL, 1933, p. 86.
Boston Traveler, November 26, 1929,
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sound fiuid ignored all evidence of inflation or excess. Early
in 1930 this became increasingly apparent as the decrease in
business which had been accelerated by the stock market panic,
failed to make a real recovery. Business was now in the de-
pression phase of the cycle.
The inauguration of the Federal Reserve System in 1913 had
quite obviously been the chief cause in preventing the cash
stringency and bank suspensions which had cheiracterized all crises
prior to 1920. The same thing was true during 1929 and the Fed-
eral Reserve System had endeavored in the summer of 1929 to check
further inflation in the stock market. After the crisis was over,
there was a searching of hearts to find who was really the cause
of the crisis. That the Federal Reserve policy since 1921 was a
contributory cause, there can be no doubt. One reputable journal
said:
”The Federal Reserve Policy is to blame for what
happened. In the last analysis, it is credit infla-
tion on an unprecedented scale which made possible the
speculation which has now collapsed. And in this credit
inflation, the Federal Reserve System has been the main
factor. Federal Reserve credit is ever on tap. There
are no limits to which the Reserve Banks may not go un-
der the war amendments of 1917. The Reserve Banks have
the right to issue Federal Reserve notes against every
dollar of gold in the country, and through their open
market operations, they can flood the country with any
amount of Reserve credit, whether there is any need
for it or not—even v/hen the member banks cannot be
cajoled into borrowing. That is precisely what the Re-
serve Banks did in 1927 when they inaugurated their easy
money policy which was the source of the whole specula-
tive debauch that followed.”^
^Commercial and Financial Chronicle, December 7, 1929, p. 3512
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The government officials staunchly defended the Federal
Reserve System Banks® That the Federal Reserve System was
not the only cause of the crisis which was due in larger measure
to the nation-wide industrial expansion and the unprecedented,
over-enthusiastic speculation of a large portion of the people,
appears to be the only conclusion that the facts of the case will
justify. In recapitulation, it may be pointed out that while we
had a sound currency, a sound banking system (except for its un-
wise credit expansion), the stock market had been diverted so far
from its proper functions that it was securing
,
for the use of
speculation, a tremendous volume of funds that should have been
used throughout the nation for working capital®
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SUIKMA-RY
The period since the Civil War has been characterized by-
great industrial growth, wes-tward expansion, and periods of
great business activity followed by crises of increasing sig-
nificance.
The crisis of 1873 came in the fall as a climax to a tre-
mendous railroad and agricultural expansion, particularly in
the west. It was preceded by a period of high prices due in
large measure to a redundant currency and nation-wide speculation
in railroad securities. The crisis was complicated by a tense
banking situation with depositors demanding their deposits in
cash. Fortunately Few York bank officials were able to cooper-
ate and issue clearing house certificates at the first wave of
distrust that swept the people. This undoubtedly prevented wide-
spread banking suspension and a complete disorganization of the
banking structure. It also made slower liquidation possible and
gave sound business firms an opportunity to readjust themselves.
The period of depression which followed was the longest in the
history of the United States but was not the most severely felt
by the masses, due to the large amounts of free land still avail-
able.
Eleven years later in the spring of 1884, another crisis ap-
peared. It differed from that of 1873 in that it was preceded by
two years of business recession. It was, therefore, chiefly
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financial in that it involved banking and brokerage houses. These
failures and suspensions were a result of much insane speculation
on the part of their officers whose actions caused considerable
suffering and distress. Bank suspensions were common in Kew York
but did not spread to an alarming degree throughout the nation.
The brunt of the losses were borne by financiers and speculators.
The business depression which followed was relatively brief because
of the two-year period of commercial liquidation which had pre-
ceded the crisis.
Early in May 1893, another crisis was brought about through
heavy withdrawals of gold from the United States by foreign in-
vestors. The mounting silver and the diminishing gold reserves
had aroused fear at home and abroad that the United States would
be forced off the gold standard. This increase in silver reserves
was a result of the Sherman Act of 1890 which had committed the
government to the purchase of 4,500,000 ounces of silver monthly.
While the monetary situation hastened the crisis, it was not the
basic cause of it. From 1886 to 1893, a great development had
taken place in industry, railroading and agriculture. LIuch of
the huge burden of debts and obligations created by this growth
was unsound. Beginning in May, the crisis spread rapidly. Comr
mercial houses, railroads, and western banks failed. Soon partial
suspension of banks was prevalent throughout the country. Hoarding
and cash premiums resulted. The situation began to readjust itself
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after President Cleveland convened Congress in special session in
August and secured the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase clause©
This removed the menace of silver and permitted the economic forces
to gradually recover their equilibrium*
The world-wide boom of 1905-1906 came to a climax in October
1907 with the complete collapse of a great speculative interest
in copper. The two chief speculators, Eeinze and Morse, were also
owners and officials in a number of banks. When the price of cop-
per dropped to less than one-half of its early spring price, the
banks in which these men were interested were besieged by long
lines of anxious depositors. Suspension was unavoidable. The
distrust spread to other banks and shortly became nation-wide*
Domestic commerce suffered greatly for as bank suspensions grew,
trade became paralyzed. As premiums developed on cash and bank-
notes gold came into the country and was used as a basis of in-
creased banknote issues; as depositors’ demands were met, the
banking situation improved and domestic and foreign exchange
slowly showed signs of improvement. By the end of November,
the feeling of panic had subsided and the depression phase was
beginning to make itself felt.
The crisis of 1920 was the result of a tremendous war boom
to industry plus nation-wide speculation in commodities. The
movement of people from country to urban communities .had caused
the growth of a belief that there would soon be a shortage of
staple coDiLiodities, As prices rose, everyone who could do so
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tried to withhold their goods from the market in anticipation
of further increases. The strain on the credit mechanism be-
came too great and beginning in Ma^, prices fell with great
rapidity. The widespread cancellation of orders added to this
decline. That bank suspensions, runs, hoarding, and cash pre-
miums which had become features of previous crises, did not appear
in this one because of the flexibility of the Federal Reserve
System’s mechanism of note issue. Commodity prices continued
to fall until January 1922, but the crisis appears to have been
over by the latter part of llovember 1920.
The great crisis of October 1929 had had its foundation in
the great industrial recovery and growth which began in 1922, but
it is attributable in a larger measvire to the tremendous stock
market boom that followed the recovery. The security-minded pub-
lic had proceeded to purchase untold issues of new stocks. Much
of this money was expended on unwise and unjustified projects.
Speculation in stocks was rampant. The fall of security prices
was unprecedented in declines as well as in the number of per-
sons affected. This intense liquidation ceased when the govern-
ment, business, and labor, through a series of conferences at the
White House, developed plans for a nation-wide stimulus to pros-
ten4eci +6
perity. The publicity given this program^reestablished confi-
dence but overlooked the unsoundness of the economic situation.
It checked the decline in the stock market and ended the crisis,
but it could not and did not avert the depression that followed.
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As the depression phase of the cycle becamie more pronounced, bank
suspensions due to unwise and ill-secured /cans on real estate
stocks, bond, and other greatly depreciated collateral became more
widespread than at any time since the inauguration of the Federal
Reserve System*
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CONCLUSION
Under the national banking system, commercial crises had
quickly developed into banking crises because of the inflexi-
bility of note issue, the association of banking and specula-
tion of various kinds, and the lack of centralized leadership.
The Federal Reserve System appeals to have overcome these
weaknesses of the old system but it has also created another
which is perhaps worse. Inaugurated at the beginning of the
war, the system grew in strength with great rapidity. It
financed the government’s war programs, it extended large amounts
of credit to the allied nations, and it facilitated great eco-
nomic expansion in this country. The system became a creator
of credit through its control over money rates that led to over-
expansion on an unprecedented scale
.
As has been pointed out, crises during the nineteenth cen-
tury tended to be largely of a banking nature in their effects.
The depressions which followed were severe but by no means as
severe as those of the twentieth century. With the diminution
of the proportion of people on farms in the United States, the
increasing industrialization, and the consequent dependence of
so many people upon wages, the crises and the resultant depres-
sions have been increasingly severe. This has been particularly
true since the development of the Federal Reserve System with its
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smaller reserve requirements and consequently greater possibilities
of increased credit inflation*
During the nineteenth century, credit inflation which un-
doubtedly existing under the National Banking System was soib-
what limited by necessary gold and reserve requirements. The
crises and depressions which followed these periods of infla-
tion were followed by periods of slow but increasing credit ex-
pains ion.
Since 1913, our banking structure has acquired the greater
part of the world’s gold. In addition to this, the Federal Re-
serve System has made possible the use of other collateral as a
basis of note issue. Through its open market operations, the
Federal Reserve Banks can practically control commercial rates
of interest. All of these means provide a foundation of over-
night creation of huge volumes of credit. This provides an
opportunity for tremendous inflation possibilities. This was
particularly true in the period from 1920-1929.
The whole effect of this increasing liberalization of credit
and consequent inflation is to make the crises more significant
and disastrous. This was shown by the great decline in indus-
trial output after the ruinous decline in commodity speculation
during 1920. The crisis of 1929, while largely evidenced in
security prices, had its roots back in the early years of the
nine-year boom that preceded it when credit was liberally ex-
tended
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The depression which has followed is the greatest in our
history and yet the banking system is pursuing its old policy
of keeping interest rates at an absurdly low figure with the
hope of fostering industrial activity, V/hile such a thing is
undoubtedly commendable during a period of depression, it has
the ultimate effect of becoming uncontrollable during a boom
period. If the Federal Reserve System tried to check inflation
during a period of great activity as it did during 1929, it would
be accused, as it has been, of precipitating a crisis.
Fortunately, the danger of the Federal Reserve System again
becoming the great financier of the securities market, has in large
measure been removed by the Banking Act of 1933. This law pro-
vides, among other things, for limitations upon member bank loans
on securities or to individuals or corporations interested in se-
curities, Loans to executive officers are no longer permitted,
limitations on advances to and investments in the secvirities of
bank affiliates are greatly restricted, and finally, member banks
are prohibited from being affiliated with securities con5)anies.
These provisions should do much to prevent a recurrence of what
took place in 1929, However, they do not minimize the possibili-
ties of unsound economic expansion through a profundity of bank
credit
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